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both the self and its life: On the one hand, this self-return of the Ego implies the birth of self-consciousness, on the other, the ‘self-split ( Selbstentzweiung )’ (Hua Dok II/1, p. 121) – and Husserl adds in a footnote – of the ‘act of living ( Lebensakt )’ ( ibid. , fn. p. 385) gives rise to the

In: Personhood, Self-Consciousness, and the First-Person Perspective
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-dualism dilemma at work. Next, I will describe John Locke’s philosophy of mind as a version of the desubstantialization that explicitly tries to overcome the dilemma within a natu- ralized view of mental states as “powers” and “operations” performed by a crea- ture living in the world. Finally, I put forward

In: Beyond Conceptual Dualism

need be held accountable. For example, a digital system equipped with such machine invention capabilities could generate solutions to the most efficient way of taking life in specific scenarios; solutions that would completely defy human logic and instincts, and therefore cannot be combated by the

In: Artificial Intelligence

’s monster, motivated by utter desolation and misery, vows to revenge itself and devastate its maker’s life. They reach a deadlock of mutual hatred and mutually inflicted misery which costs both of their lives. 5 Mary Shelley’s novel is symptomatic of modernity, a period in which human hubris no longer

In: Artificial Intelligence

to, a phenomenological life. This element apprehends the phenomenon of the depicted consciousness as a living partaking agent embedded in a lived world ( Lebenswelt ). Furthermore, the phenomenological element of “what it’s like” is also relevant to narrative, insofar it conveys access to a valuable

In: How? Enarrativity and the Cognition of Explicative Thinking
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words, MSC does not refer to self as a content or object of consciousness, that is, a what of experience. Instead, MSC concerns the how of experience: the experiences I am living through are first-personal . I am immediately familiar with my own experiences, but I do not have this same connection

In: Personhood, Self-Consciousness, and the First-Person Perspective
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views that saw consciousness as a special sort of privileged medium. The medium would be a single place in the brain where the information comes together and gives life to the experiences in front of the Subject. But the studies on parallel signal processing in the brain and about the ab- sence of

In: Beyond Conceptual Dualism
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conflict of good and responsible child care. What if parents fail and threaten the life of their children? What if robots could do a better job? Should then a robot be allowed to intervene? Presumably for this reason, the current trend in AI development is not to develop machines with a closed set of moral

In: Artificial Intelligence
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erscheint mir die folgende Position eines Biologischen Naturalismus nach wie vor plausibel: (BN*) Only a living being of a certain complex form will ever have feelings . (Lenzen 2002, S. 201) Diese These deckt sich hoffentlich mit einigen der Überlegungen, die Stephan zu seiner Theorie der

In: Wozu Gefühle? Philosophische Reflexionen für Achim Stephan
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chimpanzees] showed no interest in the social games, basically declined to participate. Most importantly, when the human partner stopped participating, no chimpanzee ever made a communicative attempt to reengage her – even in cases where they were seemingly highly motivated to obtain the goal – suggesting

In: Methodologische Signaturen