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gives both internalist and externalist accounts of reasons and motivations in his conception of agency. That is, he combines his notions, first, that reasons are motivating only when they are part of a »form of life« with, second, his idea that some forms of life may themselves be shown to be more
life’: The systematic relevance of Hegel’s social philosophy«. In: History of the Human Sciences 22 (2009a), p. 58–78. 1 In what follows, whenever social philosophy is referred to, this should be understood to include political philosophy. 2 Cf. Popper (1971) and Lukács (1962). 188 12. Individual
forfeited but the very life in the service of which self-preservation is itself undertaken becomes without substance, that is, lifeless. Life, therefore, becomes a living death. The aggression accumulated historically under the aegis of the civilizing process reaches a level at which it explodes in a
we are to resist simply equating Hegel’s speculative thought with therapy, then this strategy leads back to the first option, since the suggestion to read Hegel as a therapeutic philosopher is motivated by a need to escape Hegel’s grand claims to philosophical justification while avoiding a wholesale
present and future of the general project of an autonomous human life contained in his pure practical rationalism. The political debate constitutes a certain prolongation of the moral debate that he promoted from 1784-85 onwards, following the German translation of Cicero’s De Officiis by the eclectic
overall condition of the world through my actions? On this second issue there is no strict either-or, for it makes sense for self-perfection to be a vehicle for the perfection of the world. Yet there are significantly different ways of thinking about the moral life depending on whether self-cultivation or
»self-externality [Außersichseyn]« (E § 376). It is only this characterization of the idea that has disappeared, as a result of the immanent development of nature itself, and only in the sense that nature, with advent of the phenomenon of life, rises to the level of subjectivity, i. e. to the existence
2. Metaphysics and Common Sense John McDowell’s description of his own project as a sort of »prolegomenon to a reading of the Phenomenology« 1 motivates comparing his philosophy with the system that Hegel sets out in his Outlines for an Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. McDowell
the concept of freedom, rather than living freedom, because this concept lacks ‘the fullness of life’ (PhdG 9:118.13–15/¶200). The Stoic dictum to ‘follow na- ture’ subverts the autonomy (and hence the freedom) of thought because it attempts to derive the proper content of thought from an allegedly
like vestigial organs, such ideas may become inflamed and life-threatening. 6 Cavell points to one reason for the exclusion of the early German Romantics from the Anglophone philosophical canon: the intimate relation that the romantics posited between poetry and philosophy, a relationship that