but unable to find the palace); (4) Talmud as well as logic and math ( just outside the palace gate but unable to enter); (5) natural science (inside the antechambers of the palace); and (6) divine science- prophecy (into the inner court). It is a path in the opposite direction of the one taken by the
at the beginning, nor at a rupture that would justify the end of an era, but at a middle that defies all epochization. Graetz began his history with the talmudic age, the very age the naughty reformer Abraham Geiger would later dismiss as the age of “rigid legalism,” the age where history came to a
who is teacher and the man taught.” 99 The term limmudim brings to mind Buber’s idea of the “builder,” referring to those who serve as the center of true community, 100 since the Talmudic statement from which Buber derives this term (b. Berakhot 64a) interprets those who are “ limmudei Adonai ” as
Rabbinic Discourse as a System of Knowledge Hannah Hashkes employs contemporary philosophy in describing rabbinic reasoning as a rational response to experience. Hashkes combines insights from the philosophy of Quine and Davidson with the semiotics of Peirce to construe knowledge as systematic reasoning occurring within a community of inquiry. Her reading of the works of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion allows her to create a philosophical bridge between a discourse of God and a discourse of reason. This synthesis of pragmatism, hermeneutics and theology provides Hashkes with a sophisticated tool to understand Rabbinic Judaism. It also makes this study both unique and pathbreaking in contemporary Jewish philosophy and Rabbinic thought.