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’ agit-il que d’ un thème introducteur, qui prélude à la démonstration dialectique mais ne la remplace pas. Il n’ est pas question de cette démonstration chez Plutarque – serait-elle d’ ailleurs à sa place dans cette réflexion sur l’ Amour ? –, mais surtout ce qui est mis en balance n’ est pas la raison

In: Quelques aspects du platonisme de Plutarque

(πρεσβυτέρα… τῷ φρονεῖν μᾶλλον), l’ âge (pour lequel le comparatif est normal puisque sont mis en balance Isménodore et Bacchon) devient plus ou moins synonyme de sagesse et plutôt un avantage qu’ un inconvénient. 50 Plutarque remplace le ἄρχει de la protase – employé aussi par Pisias – par κυβερνήσει (754D5

In: Quelques aspects du platonisme de Plutarque

la punition des méchants, qui ne sont eux-mêmes qu’ un des aspects du “thème moral” qui met en balance, le plus souvent, le malheur des bons et le bonheur des méchants, 29 comme le montre l’ espèce de répertoire des attaques contre la Providence que constituent les traités Sur la Providence de

In: Quelques aspects du platonisme de Plutarque

l’ introduit avec un très grand relief : Mais, mon cher Archédémos, la mauvaise fortune, qui cherchait à mettre en balance la lâcheté et l’ ignorance de nos ennemis avec notre audace et notre préparation et à faire de notre entreprise une sorte de drame qu’ elle émaillait depuis le début d

In: Quelques aspects du platonisme de Plutarque

Ernest Barker is best remembered for his study of Plato and his Predecessors (1918), yet his early efforts to mine Greek political theory for relevant insights centred on Aristotle.While not as original as his teacher, Aristotle represents a significant advance in political science, first, by avoiding Plato’s extremes, second, by forwarding a naturalistic and ethical vision of civic life, and finally, by adopting a pragmatic approach to improving ‘deviant’ regimes. Both thinkers serve as a foil for exposing the shortcomings of modern politics, particularly the atomistic individualism of Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham. Unlike Plato, Aristotle exhibits an ‘English spirit’ of compromise, moderation, and balance, although from a distinctly Burkean perspective. Barker’s sympathies did not, however, blind him to the ‘reactionary’, ‘primitive’, and ‘illiberal’ aspects of Aristotle’s teaching. His failure to reconcile these discordant elements—culminating in a quixotic call for an ‘aristocratic democracy’ — merely echoed the ambiguity and equivocation that marked his treatment of Plato. Barker maintained a grudging respect for Plato, but knew he was politically incorrigible. Aristotle showed farmore promise, but in the end could not be made to fit the mould of the Edwardian progressive.

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought

and the certainly spurious Rhesus ) on one scale, and the eleven Aristophanic comedies on the other – though the bulk of comic fragments might, to some extent, produce a different picture. But that is not the point. What is worth stressing is that balance was not our priority: we had not planned to

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought

balance, characterizing the Roman constitution as a configuration of custom, law, and right. Atkins uses Polybius to tour Roman political institutions and procedures, suggesting the limits of Polybius’ analysis as well as differentiating Polybius from Cicero in their conceptions of the Roman constitution

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought

see the beginning of a theme in Books i and ii : The purpose of the law is to paternalistically balance the different aspects of the citizen’s life. In Book i , the purpose of the law is to maximize both the welfare interests – or human benefits – in a person’s life and the moral interests – or

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought

balance, so I will include those passages here (35n91, 39n114, 39-41, 93n40, 94n46, 141n98, 150n165). Next there is the question of the book’s value to non-Straussian scholars working on Cicero, and here again a negative response must be rendered unless , that is, any non-Straussian scholars are

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought

… never to be simply or immediately accepted as Plato’s “teaching” or belief, but they are there’ (p. xiii). Bailey thus hopes to strike a balance between negative refutation and positive assertion – a tentative balance, though, since the former may eventually undermine the latter. In his own words (and

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought