relationships, democracies have essentially two strategic policy choices: whether to isolate or engage the adversary. Accepting that binary choice for analytical purposes, the article first sketches democracies’ past and present use of public diplomacy in hostile relations with non-democracies. The article then
frequently when a mediator perceives negative emotions, such as anger or fear. Th e results of a web survey of North Ameri- can mediators that classiﬁed mediation tactics are presented. Th e authors also interviewed international mediators and diplomats who have formally or informally, oﬃcially or unoﬃcially
-agent literature on delegation, as well as the bargaining literature on mediation and leadership. Principal-agent theory posits that opportunism is an ever-present problem when power of decision is delegated from one actor to another. As Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew McCubbins emphasize: ‘Th ere is almost always
in the areas of foreign relations and trade, European cooperation, development cooperation and consular services provided to Dutch nationals abroad. Responsibility for foreign trade was added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ core tasks when the present Dutch government was formed in 2012.
supported by the continuing salience of European Commission staff in the operations of delegations, as noted in the introduction to this special issue of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy .
Second, the Lisbon Treaty has not dissolved the distinctions and divisions between the agency present in what was
firstname.lastname@example.org Received: 5 June 2008 Accepted: 9 October 2008 Summary Religion has been largely absent in diplomacy, particularly in the Western world, for a long time. Some would even say since the Enlightenment. Moreover, religion has been ignored in present-day theories of international
War in 2002 and 2003 seemed to present an international environ- ment that was conducive to stronger China–EU ties. Subsequently, however, the difficulties of engaging with a complex entity like the EU have contributed to souring diplomatic relations. This development is traced for two major cases of
This article deliberates on the effects of sub-nationalism on the profile of a region in external relations. The questions under consideration in the present contribution are: (1) does nationalism make the external relations of a region conflictual vis-à-vis the federal centre?; and (2) to what extent can its alleged ill effect be counter-balanced by the well-elaborated mechanism of centre-regional coordination? This article aims to contest the assumptions of mainstream thinking in the literature on paradiplomacy, which suggests that sub-nationalism might have a negative effect and that strong institutions are indispensable for a positive outcome. Relying on an analysis of external relations in Tatarstan, a republic in the Russian Federation, this contribution illustrates the crucial role of the ‘manipulative’ form of nationalism as a key factor shaping the functional character of paradiplomacy.
Against conventional approaches that tend to minimize the importance of sub-state diplomacy, this article argues that this reality is presently undergoing a process of legal and political normalization throughout the world and deserves greater attention from both diplomatic practitioners and experts. This process, which is embedded in wider structural transformations, is driven simultaneously by two competing forces that are present in virtually all states: first, international mobilization of sub-state governments themselves, since they increasingly pursue relevant political objectives in the international field through their own methods and instruments; and second, the various attempts to limit and control that activism deployed by central governments through various legal and political instruments. After a brief discussion on the notion of normalization in critical social theory and its validity for diplomatic studies, this article examines the normalization of sub-state diplomacy through four, closely interconnected conceptual lenses: normalization as generalization; normalization as regionalization; normalization as reflective adaptation; and, finally, normalization as contentious regulation. Normalization enables the diplomatic system to operate in an increasingly complex environment while simultaneously affirming its own hierarchical structure. The limits of that normalization process, as well as its wider implications for diplomatic theory and practice, are also discussed.
This article analyses the international relations of Mexican sub-state governments. It aims to answer four questions: 1) What explains the recent and dramatic increase in their international activities?; 2) Do these federal units have an independent foreign policy?; 3) What are their levels or degrees of sub-state diplomacy?; and 4) Which variables explain the variation in their degree of sub-state diplomacy? The first section argues that the growth in international activities is generated by the combination of two sets of variables: a) the growing interdependence and globalization of the international system; and b) the democratization, decentralization and structural reform processes in the domestic arena. The second section sustains that Mexican sub-national units do not have a foreign policy of their own. The third section shows that there is a wide variation in the states’ degree of international participation. In order to characterize this variation, a typology is constructed and the 32 Mexican federal units are classified in two moments in time (2004 and 2009) and a comparative analysis between these two periods is presented. The fourth section argues that the degree of sub-state diplomacy depends on three variables: economic (gross state product); political (juxtaposed government); and geographic (border location). Each of these variables is tested to determine its impact, providing evidence to sustain the relevance of the economic variable, arguing that juxtaposed government functions as a trigger variable for initiating or increasing external activities, and that the border is a necessary, but not sufficient, variable to explain the degree of international projection.