-gawa’, 4 help her to relate to her previous life in the homeland and adopt a transnational identity, in which she ‘can feel at home while living abroad’. However, when Mili uses the word ‘she is referring to Osaka more than Tokyo’, as she explains that ‘the two cities [Tokyo and Shanghai] are just so
giving me more knowledge about how to be a good female Muslim, but also motivate me to have extra energy to be committed to what I have chosen for my life, like this hijab syarʿi .
In addition, Ayu and her team also strive not to post about controversial issues. They also block negative comments by
them it’s a business: occupying land, which is a mechanism for owning it … and you know what the price of land is here! A rickshaw driver just deserves the right to accept, but not own the shelter, because priority for him is not living, not quality of life, it is money.
‘a proper Islamic life’ (ibid.: 74). In short, the Instagram daʾwa accounts motivate their followers to adopt virtuous habits and cultivate an ethical lifestyle, and, because of their popularity, they normalize the notion of hijrah amongst Muslim youth.
They also inculcate daʾwa business
5 February 2013 through a Facebook event. Within a short period, the protests spread throughout the country and around the world where Bangladeshis reside. People from all walks of life joined the protests and expressed their solidarity with the movement by demanding death sentences for war
encounters are not simply face-to-face meetings but a sign of readiness to make an effort to leave work or other life activities to spend more time with fellow netizens (see also Seto 2017: 81). These face-to-face meetings are a ritual initiation for becoming an acknowledged member of a group. The frequent
involved in terrorism/violence, and not every terrorist (someone engaging in politically motivated violent behaviour meant to inspire fear) is necessarily ‘radical’. In other words: a terrorist does not necessarily hold religiously ‘extreme’ views (Horgan & Taylor 2011: 174). Consequently, countering
; Schmidt 2017; Shamsul 1999). Compared to their peers in much of the global North, a large part of Southeast Asia’s young middle class arguably has opted to live ‘the modern life’ religiously and often in ways more orthodox than their parents or grandparents would have done only one or two generations
trafficked goods and services, as well as offers motivated by superstitions or informal and forbidden opinions. We observed propaganda on less than half the pages in the sample, and a low volume of comments in this category. In addition to public postings of advertisements, we identified comments directing
that it is only possible for the rich to find happiness and meaning in life when they give to the poor. There is, therefore, a subsequent understanding that this would then translate downwards to the poor being motivated to help those even less fortunate than them. This downward giving is not always