people whose activities and well-being we do not ourselves control, and in whom we have invested a good measure of our well-being. They are our hostages to fortune. In emotions we recognize our own passivity before the ungoverned events of life. 259
Von der hier beschriebenen Passivität gegenüber dem
life is no longer worth living (or, worse, has become worth not living), thus that continued life will be bad enough that shortening it will be (prudentially) better.
The presupposition behind the rationality of such a decision seems to be that the value of alife at a time (or through an interval
as claiming no more than conventional correctness—correctness as a matter of conformity with local traditions, customs, and practices—for the Sceptic’s way of life. 12 Sextus suggests that the Sceptic follows a certain account of how to live correctly by living in accordance with what it apparent
attitudes the person has towards those states. A person whose life has a positive balance of pleasure over pain experiences increased well-being even if that person does not have a positive attitude towards his or her own positive hedonic states (nor a negative attitude towards the negative hedonic states
, but the stakes are large. Broome estimates that the lifetime emissions of a person living in a developed nation cost six months of healthy human life in expectation (Broome 2012, ch. 5). 3 In a more recent paper, he concludes that individuals altruistically concerned with the climate are thus “not
reflection on our life, we develop an individual and distinguishing identity , a self-haecceity, which he terms the “personal ego” or “personal subject,” (ibid, 261) and which we can also call (following Beyer 2012 ) a “personal self-notion” (109).
High-level empathy begins with self-experience of my
1993 upon being told that the new facility would be a home for life. In 1998, the health authority decided to close the new facility and transfer the citizen again. At this point, the citizen sought to estop the transfer on the basis that the government had induced legitimate expectations of having a
solely in realizing this merely temporal structure, being-conscious of ‘the living now’ in the midst of a flow of ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions’ of past and future.
This flow is more primitive both in the sense that it provides that within which, and out of which, all the more ordinary concrete
disobedience with the aim of remedying the majority’s wrong? A similar line of reasoning motivates the justification of epistocracy or expert rule: if we think it important that our political decisions be correct, then why not let the epistemically more qualified parts of our population make our political
foundation of cooperation and trust. If the abuses of assertion were left unchecked, the practice would break down: we could no longer take others at their word. The practice continues because humans are fundamentally honest, and motivated to provide others with reliable information. This honesty is a