. 166 Stärker noch spricht David Velleman davon, dass die Emotion der Scham durch das Gefühl der Angst konstituiert werde: Threats to your standing as a self-presenting creature are thus a source of deep anxiety, and anxiety about the threatened loss of that standing is , in my view, what constitutes
might merely try to conjecture what motivated her via imagining myself being compelled by randomly generated imagined motives.
I may have to use this method if the other person’s motivations are completely out of line with mine at any point in my life. I would get a less intuitively full form of
Conception. I invite others to articulate it further. In doing so, we return to the ancient Pyrrhonian insight that skepticism is a practice integral to livinga good life.
Even if Pyrrhonians went much too far in rejecting all belief, this insight of theirs deserves preserving.
of assertion were left unchecked, the practice would break down: we could no longer take others at their word. The practice continues because humans are fundamentally honest, and motivated to provide others with reliable information. This honesty is a foundation of assertion. Although not all
discovered living things, it seemed intuitively plausible to develop a new unifying system of classification that was capable to cover them all. Of course, several classification systems had already been in use in the biological disciplines (dating back, at least, to Aristotle), but it was only Carl Linnaeus
plane”, and thereby motivate the idea that investigation into spiritual virtues should not be merely the concern of people of a particular religious tradition, or of mystics, but of everyone concerned with livinga good life. This collection provides helpful nuance and diversity to the contemporary
This is a collection of essays selected from J.B. Schneewind’s 60 years of published work in philosophy. The volume closes with an afterward, a compelling intellectual autobiography, ‘Sixty Years of Philosophy in aLife’, which he originally gave as the Dewey Lecture at the 2008 APA Eastern
this Marsyas here at my side makes me feel all the time: he makes it seem that my life isn’t worth living! … He always traps me, you see, and he makes me admit that my political career is a waste of time, while all that matters is just what I most neglect: my personal shortcomings, which cry out for
need for both a narrative self and an experiential self, it becomes urgent to understand their relation (Zahavi, 2010a). In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained wide acceptance. According to one category, “strong narrativism”, our experiential life has fundamentally a narrative
question; we are always already in life” (Henry, 2003, p. 187). To Michel Henry, asking for a way to reach the intransitive process of self-affection of life is tantamount to ask “How do I get to where I am already?”. This clear statement of the impossibility to access the living process very much sounds