though this points towards a very important aspect, the badness of death cannot be explained solely via the desire to continue living.
For one thing, one does not always have to explicitly express a desire for x for x to be in one’s interest and, accordingly, to be harmed by x’s non-occurrence. In
harm to a child than it does to a newborn infant, then we are in need of an alternative account of the badness of death. Jeff McMahan now proposes that how much someone is harmed by his death is not only a question of how much future good his life would have contained, but also, how much he himself is
continuing to live is so weak in relation to our interest in ending the cow’s life, that her death can be morally justified. Another person may disagree on the basis that the cow’s inherent value gave her a right not to be sacrificed for the greater overall utility. Put differently, the claim that animals
have to take into account the fact that an agent has a »special claim to and authority over his or her own life and body« (Scanlon 2000, 313). Accepting a principle that permitted killing A so that B and C will not be killed »would be to take the view that our bodies are resources over which everyone
I am taking it as read that there are certain prerequisites to livinga fully flourishing human life: that in order to do so an individual must have the capability, or meaningful opportunity, to enjoy continued life (at least to a normal human length), bodily health, bodily integrity
obtaining food. Or, consider a person who is constantly told untrue or misleading information. She will not only be unable to successfully achieve her desired goal that motivates her to act but she will also have a hard time maintaining the resources she already successfully achieved.
Next to well
globe (Cripps, 2013, p. 152).
Because Al Gore is aliving public figure, I would like to refrain from discussing Al Gore’s personal consistency here. But the point of consistency may be discussed without reference to real life persons: Suppose there is a public figure who finds herself in the position
’s time-relative interest account of the badness of death and his depiction of the stuck-in-time animal, confined to a mental life in the present. Obviously, but worth noting, the stuck-in-time hypothesis does not entail that animals cannot behave in a future-oriented manner. Animals constantly behave
plane”, and thereby motivate the idea that investigation into spiritual virtues should not be merely the concern of people of a particular religious tradition, or of mystics, but of everyone concerned with livinga good life. This collection provides helpful nuance and diversity to the contemporary
This is a collection of essays selected from J.B. Schneewind’s 60 years of published work in philosophy. The volume closes with an afterward, a compelling intellectual autobiography, ‘Sixty Years of Philosophy in aLife’, which he originally gave as the Dewey Lecture at the 2008 APA Eastern