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Aidan McGlynn

feminist versions of standpoint epistemology, of the sort introduced in the previous paragraph, were adaptations or extensions of Marxist standpoint theories. The proletariat in a capitalist society can have a better understanding of how social reality functions, according to this Marxist position, since

Michael Klenk

adaptations and, via the claims that adaptations do not track moral truth and that non-truth tracking belief-forming methods defeat, concludes that moral judgements are unjustified (183). Pölzler’s interest lies in the question of whether moral judgements are adaptations and he concludes that existing

Kirk Lougheed

advantage. The contingent process of evolution resulted in our sort of brain, but had different adaptations occurred we would have a different brain. Chalmers explains McGinn’s idea: It is sometimes suggested that there is a Darwinian explanation for the lack of progress in philosophy. The rough idea is

Dōgen and Continental Philosophy

An Essay on the Powers of Thinking

Jason M. Wirth

its own terms in a way that opens it to a serious dialogue with Buddhist thought. This can be seen, for example, in the profound adaptation of Continental themes and practices by the Kyoto School, which not only carved out space for Japanese Mahāyāna Buddhist thought within the world of Continental


Temenuga Trifonova

The Image in French Philosophy challenges dominant interpretations of Bergson, Sartre, Lyotard, Baudrillard and Deleuze by arguing that their philosophy was not a critique but a revival of metaphysics as a thinking pertaining to impersonal forces and distinguished by an aversion to subjectivity and an aversion of the philosophical gaze away from the discourse of vision, and thus away from the image. Insofar as the image was part of the discourse of subjectivity/representation, getting rid of the subject involved smuggling the concept of the image out of the discourse of subjectivity/representation into a newly revived and ethically flavored metaphysical discourse—a metaphysics of immanence, which was more interested in consciousness rather than subjectivity, in the inhuman rather than the human, in the virtual rather than the real, in Time rather than temporalization, in Memory rather than memory-images, in Imagination rather than images, in sum, in impersonal forces, de-personalizing experiences, states of dis-embodiment characterized by the breaking down of sensory-motor schemata (Bergson’s pure memory, Sartre’s image-consciousness, Deleuze’s time-image) or, more generally, in that which remains beyond representation i.e. beyond subjectivity (Lyotard’s sublime, Baudrillard’s fatal object). The book would be of interest to scholars and students of philosophy, aesthetics, and film theory.

Harald Thorsrud

aspirations of rational inquiry and the parochial sensibilities of his readers. To Romanize Greek philosophy requires more than linguistic translation; cultural adaptations are required as well. First and foremost, Cicero’s readers need to be convinced of the importance and value of philosophy. Chapter 2

Jonas Olson

before, Joyce’s primary aim is not to offer decisive arguments, but to explore and clarify what it would mean for the capacity of moral judgement to be either an adaptation or a by-product (“spandrel”) of natural selection. Both chapters are illuminating and helpful contributions, especially for

Stéphane Marchand

probante, s’oppose aux thèses de Charles Brittain sur les diff érentes étapes de la pensée de Philon de Larissa. 4 La véritable évolution de l’Acadé- mie est liée à l’adaptation de l’enseignement philonien au public romain. Car Philon « était confronté à Rome à un public fondamentalement diff érent de celui

John Christian Laursen

his vocabulary of fantasy and appearance than that of Sanches. Even today, it would be taken as a sort of skepticism if we pepper our vocabulary with terms like ‘appearance’ and ‘fantasy’ and limit ourselves to observations about the phenomena. Paganini points out that Montaigne’s adaptation of the

Bredo Johnsen

requires showing it to be probable relative to my “data,” as Greco (with nearly all contemporary epistemologists) seems to assume, then a simple adaptation of Hume’s skeptical reasoning concerning induction to subjective, rather than objective, data shows that it cannot be done. (ii) Since most