Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 53 items for :

  • All: "belief" x
  • Brill | Rodopi x
  • Philosophy of Science x
Clear All

Series:

Jeanne Peijnenburg

Abstract

Kuipers’ model of action explanation is compared, first with that of Anscombe, and then with models in the post-Anscombian tradition. Whereas Kuipers and Anscombe differ on the question of the first-person view, the difference with post-Anscombian writers concerns the so-called intentional statement. Kuipers criticizes the models of both Hempel and von Wright for their lack of an intentional statement. Kuipers’ own model seems immune to this criticism, since it contains no less than two intentional statements, a “specific” and an “unspecific” one. I argue that, contrary to appearances, it is not so immune. The call for intentional statements is in fact a call for intentions that are irreducible to beliefs and desires. Kuipers’ intentional statements, however, are about intentions that can be so reduced.

Series:

Joke Meheus

Abstract

In this paper, I present the discussive adaptive logic DLIr. As is the case for other discussive logics, the intended application context of DLIr is the interpretation of discussions. What is new about the system is that it does not lead to explosion when some of the premises are selfcontradictory. It is argued that this is important in view of the fact that human reasoners are not logically omniscient, and hence, that it may not be evident to discover the inconsistencies in one’s beliefs. In addition to this, DLIr can handle cases in which different participants contradict each other. It is shown that, in both kinds of cases, DLIr leads to an interpretation of the discussion that is as rich as possible (even though no discussive connectives are introduced).

Series:

Tadeusz Szubka

Abstract

The realism debate concerns the relationship of our beliefs, thoughts and language to the world or universe, and hence involves a number of fundamental questions ranging from metaphysics through epistemology to semantics and philosophy of language. While a few philosophers take it as an inevitable feature of the debate and try to advance it by coping simultaneously with all those questions, a number of others insists that the approach of this kind leads merely to confusions and misunderstandings. They usually suggest that the metaphysical or ontological aspects of it should be kept separate from such epistemological and semantic issues as the possibility of absolute knowledge, the correspondence theory of truth, or the truth-conditional theory of meaning. In other words, there is such a thing as pure or simple metaphysical realism that may be endorsed and defended, or undermined and rejected. The aim of the paper is to raise some doubts about that metaphilosophical strategy, and to argue that the comprehensive approach to the realism debate, in which the metaphysical issues are combined with –– at least –– some epistemological matters, is not so much caused by confusions and misunderstandings, but forced, as it were, by its subject matter and the philosophical nature of the debate.

Katarzyna Paprzycka

Series:

Carmen M. Cusack

diagnoses from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual may be validated by some prehistoric cultures, which rejected fishing and Ichthyophagi (Cusack, 2011; Simoons, 1994 ). Fish avoidance may have correlated with class; perception of inedibility or uncleanliness; cults; diet; size; beliefs about sin

Series:

Krister Segerberg

Abstract

Dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) is the modal logic of belief change. In basic DDL a modal operator [*?] carries the informal meaning “after the agent has revised his beliefs by ?” or “after the agent has accepted the information that ?”; it is assumed that the arguments of the star operator * are pure Boolean formulæ. That assumption is discarded in full DDL where any pure doxastic formula may be an argument. As noted by other authors, a straight-forward extension of the theory from basic DDL to full DDL invites problems of the kind first discussed by G. E. Moore. In this paper it is argued that a way to escape those problems is to redefine revision in a way that seems appropriate for this semantically richer context. The paper deals only with the one-agent case, but the approach can be extended to the case of multiple agents.

Propositions

Semantic and Ontological Issues

Series:

Edited by Massimiliano Carrara and Elisabetta Sacchi

This special issue of GPS collects 11 papers (and a long introduction), by leading philosophers and young researchers, which tackle more or less from close the topic of propositions by trying to provide the reader with a cross-section of the ongoing debate in this area. The raised issues range over the semantics, the ontology, the epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics and stimulate the reader to reflect on crucial problems such as the following: are propositions objects? In the positive case, what kind of objects are they? Can they be grasped by cognitive creatures such as we are? When can we say that two people entertain the same proposition? Have propositions any role to play in speech act theory? Even though the notion of proposition has received considerable attention in the past philosophical debate, it is still of great interest, in particular in connection with the attacks which have recently been launched against it in the theory of language. The volume, which is equipped with a long and detailed introduction that supplies the young reader with useful background information on the different stances in the debate, could prove useful also for didactic purposes.

The Courage of Doing Philosophy

Essays Presented to Leszek Nowak

Edited by Jerzy Brzezinski, Andrzej Klawiter, Theo A.F. Kuipers, Krzysztof Lastowski, Katarzyna Paprzycka and Piotr Przybysz

In recent years, the problem if idealization has been one of the central issues discussed in philosophy of science. This volume gathers original essays written by well-known philosophers. The papers address the method of idealization and its applications in science as well as ontological and epistemological problems that have arisen. Among the questions addressed are: What is the logical form of idealizational statements and how should they be interpreted? Is the possible worlds semantics useful in understanding idealization? What is the relation between idealization and truth? The volume is a celebration of Leszek Nowak’s sixtieth birthday.

Series:

Edited by Robert Wesson and Patricia A. Williams

Initiated by Robert Wesson, Evolution and Human Values is a collection of newly written essays designed to bring interdisciplinary insight to that area of thought where human evolution intersects with human values. The disciplines brought to bear on the subject are diverse - philosophy, psychiatry, behavioral science, biology, anthropology, psychology, biochemistry, and sociology. Yet, as organized by co-editor Patricia A. Williams, the volume falls coherently into three related sections. Entitled Evolutionary Ethics, the first section brings contemporary research to an area first explored by Herbert Spencer. Evolutionary ethics looks to the theory of evolution by natural selection to find values for human living. The second section, Evolved Ethics, discusses the evolution of language and religion and their impact on moral thought and feeling. Evolved ethics was partly Charles Darwin's subject in The Descent of Man. The last section bears the title Scientific Ethics. A nascent field, scientific ethics asks about the evolution of human nature and the implications of that nature for ethical theory and social policy. Together, the essays collected here provide important contemporary insights into what it is - and what it may be - to be human.