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Intentional Horizons

The Mind from an Epistemic Point of View


Magdalena Balcerak Jackson

The book is a defense of intentionalism. According to intentionalism the phenomenal character of all mental states - such as thoughts, perceptions, emotions or bodily sensations - is determined by their intentional properties, that is by their meaning. Many philosophers of mind are attracted to intentionalism because they assume that an intentional description of mental phenomena contributes to a reduction of mental properties to physical properties. This book adopts a different point of view: We can see intentionality more fruitfully as the basis for a theory that explains how various different mental states are epistemically significant for us. Once we adopt an epistemological perspective on the mind, we can formulate an intentionalist theory that not only has more explanatory force, but is also more phenomenologically adequate than accounts available so far. The book has two parts: The first half is primarily a methodological analysis of how we should and should not study intentionality and discuss intentionalism. The second half begins the positive work of developing a successful intentionalist theory based on an enriched epistemic two-dimensional semantics for mental states.

Vincent F. Hendricks

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how methodological insights from formal and modal learning theory have a significant bearing on the classical definition of knowledge as true justified belief.


Wenceslao J. Gonzalez


Universalism in science, when conceived in methodological terms, leads to the problem of the limits of science. On the one hand, there is "methodological imperialism," which in principle involves a form of universalism. On the other hand, there is the multivariate complexity – structural and dynamic, as well as epistemological and ontological – which represents a huge problem for methodological universalism, as may be seen with the obstacles for scientific prediction. Within the context of the limits of science, there is a better understanding of the issues of expansionism and imperialism.

Towards a Revival of Analytical Philosophy of History

Around Paul A. Roth's Vision of Historical Sciences


Edited by Krzysztof Brzechczyn

Towards a Revival of Analytical Philosophy of History: Around Paul A. Roth's Vision of Historical Sciences presents the state of the art in the philosophy of history. The purpose of this book is to discuss the revival of analytical philosophy of history proposed by Paul A. Roth, a world-known analytical philosopher of the social sciences and the humanities. The first four papers outline the reasons for the decline of philosophy of history, its present phase of development, and its possible future. The other authors discuss important questions of this field of research including: the ontological status of the past, the epistemological assumptions of historical research, the explanatory dimensions of the narrative. In the last group of papers, the authors apply some of Roth's theoretical ideas within their own fields of research.

Contributors are: Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Nancy D. Campbell, Serge Grigoriev, Géza Kállay, Piotr Kowalewski, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Chris Lorenz, Herman Paul, Dawid Rogacz, Paul A. Roth, Laura Stark, Stephen Turner, Rafał Paweł Wierzchosławski, and Eugen Zeleňák.


Edited by Rosa M. Calcaterra

The strong influence of pragmatism in the early 20th-century international debate, its subsequent and apparently inexorable decline, and its recent revival are intertwined with the fate of other currents of thought that have marked the development of contemporary philosophy. This volume clarifies the most recent events of this development focusing on key theoretical issues common both to American classic philosophical tradition and analytical thought.
Many essays in this volume belong to what we can call “new” pragmatism, namely a pragmatist perspective that is different from the postmodernist “neo” pragmatism à la Rorty. The volume shows that both pragmatists and analytic thinkers stress the importance of logic and scientific method in order to deal with philosophical problems and seek for a clarification of the relation between our ethical values and our understanding of natural facts. Moreover, the anti-skeptic attitude that characterizes pragmatism as well as most part of analytic philosophy, and their common attention to the problems of language and communication are emphasized. The more sophisticated tools for addressing both theoretical and methodological problems developed by analytic philosophy are pointed out, and the essays show the possible integration of these two forms of speculation that, for too a long time, mutually disregarded one another.


Edited by Johannes L. Brandl and Jan Woleński

Kazimierz Twardowski (20/10/1866, Vienna – 11/02/1938, Lvov) is most commonly known as the teacher of great philosophers and the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. As a philosopher however, he is primarily remembered for his famous comparison of the contents and objects of various kinds of representations, a comparison that remains enshrined in European thought. In fact, he attained important results in many other branches of philosophy as well. For instance, in (descriptive) ontology, he laid the foundations for the modern theory of formal structure of objects, and he introduced the theoretically fruitful pair of terms, action-product. In epistemology, he developed a profound analysis of the notion and criteria of truth; and he provided a forceful account of the errors underlying relativist theories of truth. In methodology, he drew an explicit distinction between the processes of discovering, systematising, and grounding in science, and he offered accurate descriptions of the nature of psychology and other humanities. In (philosophical) logic, he offered decisive arguments on behalf of the idiogenetic conception of judgement, and he improved the traditional typology of adjectives. These achievements are of significance that is not only historical. Kazimierz Twardowski's work, formulated in plain, precise language, are instructive and inspiring for contemporary students of philosophy.


Balász M. Mezei and Barry Smith

Brentano's Four Phases of Philosophy, first published in 1895 and here translated into English for the first time, presents a dramatic account of the history of philosophy in terms of a succession of cycles of renewal and decline. Phases of renewal are associated with the rediscovery of science, of empiricism, of rigour and clarity. Phases of decline are associated with competing schools and sects, with mysticism and obfuscation, and with relativisms and idealisms of various sorts. Each final phase of decline, with its ultimate collapse into nonsense, gives rise to the call for a new phase of renewal, and Aristotle, in Brentano's eyes, represents the ideal type of this renewal phase of philosophy. Brentano exploits his cyclical theory to provide a guiding path through the history of Western philosophy from the beginnings in the Presocratics to what was from his perspective the final phase of decline in the work of Kant and the German idealists. In an extensive introduction, Balász Mezei and Barry Smith present a detailed account of Brentano's method in the history of philosophy. They demonstrate its roots in the work of August Comte, and compare it to other methodologies in the historiography of philosophy, including that of Kant. Most interestingly, however, they seek to bring up to date Brentano's account of the cycles of renewal and decline in the history of philosophy. They show how Brentano's method can be applied to the histories of twentieth-century analytic and Continental philosophy, from their auspicious beginnings in the work of Frege and Husserl (and Brentano) himself to their ultimate decline in the work of Rorty, Levinas and Derrida.


Krzysztof Brzechczyn

1 Introduction The subject matter of historical narration has been the central issue of the philosophy and methodology of history since at least the last quarter of the 20th century, after the publication of Hayden White’s Metahistory ( White 1973 )—a turning point, in that respect, in the


Edited by Władysław Krajewski

The volume is a collection of essays about prominent Polish 20th century philosophers of science and scientists who were concerned with problems in the philosophy of science. The contribution made by Polish logicians, especially those from the Lvov-Warsaw School, like Łukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski or Ajdukiewicz, is already well known. One of the aims of the volume is to offer a broader perspective. The papers collected here are devoted to the work of such philosophers as Zawirski, Metallmann, Dąmbska, Mehlberg, Szaniawski and Giedymin as well as to the work of such scientists as Smoluchowski, Fleck, Infeld and Chyliński. The introduction to the volume, written by the editor and Jacek Jadacki, presents an overview of the history of the Polish philosophy of science from the foundation of the Cracow Academy (in 1364) to the present.


Raya Dunayevskaya

Edited by Franklin Dmitryev

, “Of all the problems in Marx’s economic theory the most neglected has been that of his method both in general and, specifically, in relation to Hegel” (p. xi), methodology is the underlying motif not only of his “critical excursus,” but the reason for writing the whole of the 581 pages. I wish I could