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Esben Petersen

the prediction objection , i.e., the objection that skeptical predictions conflict with the way we ordinarily speak and think about knowledge ( Bonjour 2010, DeRose 1995, Greco 2000, Grice 1989, Hawthorne 2004, Lewis 1996 , Schaffer 2004a ). Roughly put, the objection is that skepticism leads to

J. Adam Carter

wrong kinds of inferences, predictions, etc.). On a performative reading, understanding implies not just grasping but successful grasping. On a success reading, grasping is implicitly successful in the way understanding demands. We are in a position to say something now about how to fill in our blank

Majid Davoody Beni

belief formation. The paper makes a strong improvement upon the existing extensions of reliabilism in this respect. That is to say, I characterise reliable processes in terms of prediction error minimisation cognitive mechanisms (as being revealed by the Prediction Error Minimisation theory [ pem for

Michael Klenk

external or internal validity” (132, emphasis added) and that the evidence “does not allow any assessment of sentimentalism’s emotionism-related empirical predictions” (138, emphasis added). Irrespective of the details of Pölzler’s analysis, it is not clear that sentimentalism is relevant for his project

Luigi Perissinotto

Objects A number of things need to be said if we are to understand the meaning of Wittgenstein’s recourse to the unheard-of. The first is that when Wittgenstein wonders how we would react if something really unheard-of happened he is not asking us to make a forecast, a prediction, or some sort of

Prediction Objection  193 Esben Petersen Underdetermination Skepticism and Skeptical Dogmatism  218 Mark Walker Discussion Against Piecemeal Skepticism  253 Eric Yang Book Reviews Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism  257

Annalisa Coliva and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

from oc 513 where Wittgenstein asks “What if something really unheard-of happened?” Perissinotto claims that with this question Wittgenstein is not asking us to make a forecast, a prediction, or some sort of empirico-psychological prophecy about our possible reactions. Rather, the question is part

Scott Aikin and Alyssa Lowery

and Stephen Wykstra reply that a proper version of moderate skeptical theism can mirror all the predictions a naturalist would make about suffering, and so the atheistic argument would be rebutted, because, again, the evidence is consistent with both views. Draper responds that Perrine and Wykstra

Ruth Weintraub

: 37). Now, the principle of uniformity is obscure. Ayer (1972: 20–21) thinks that the principle, as Hume construes it, is too strong: when conjoined with a statement of some observed regularity, it logically entails predictions about unobserved cases. But, Ayer points out, we do not take a counter

Danny Frederick

alternative hypothesis typically generates predictions that are inconsistent with the predictions generated by the customary interpretation. So, once we entertain such a hypothesis, we are primed to notice things that we might not otherwise have noticed. If we thereby notice something that is incompatible