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Genia Schönbaumsfeld

The present issue initially started life as a workshop on the title theme that I organized at the University of Southampton in 2018. It contains some of the papers given at the workshop, as well as ones specially commissioned for the present edition. The result is an innovative compilation that

Frank Cabrera

, we have good inductive reason to believe that there are always rival theories, unconceived by present scientists, which explain our available evidence equally well as the best available explanation. All three arguments, if sound, would undercut the rationality of employing ibe . Of these last three

Yuval Avnur

credulity is not a vice. Zagzebski (1996: 135) requires intentional cultivation, Battaly (2014: 65) discusses the idea that certain “motivations” must be present if there is to be a vice, and Cassam (2016: 169) requires that a vice impede “effective and responsible inquiry.” None of these are met in

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

picture of our epistemic situation which conceives of the ‘external world’ not as something that is, in principle, directly present to the senses, but rather as something that we can only know about by dint of making inferences from our mental states or apparent ‘perceptual’ experiences. And once such a

Pierre Le Morvan

, but to give grounds for why the Conception also provides a valuable way of conceptualizing skepticism. Below I present four such grounds. 5.1 Making Skepticism Relevant Suppose (counterfactually) that ethical theorizing on (say) justice were dominated by two conceptual frameworks, and on both

J. Adam Carter

the ignorance in question. But, if we are to read the disjunctive account as maintaining that lacking ‘ α ’ implies ignorance in some cases where the relevant knowledge (constituting the subject matter) is present, then we lose our grip on any important contrast between knowledge and ignorance, by

Aidan McGlynn

below. Much more could be said about each of these approaches, but I want to finish this section by briefly addressing a rather neglected question: what is the relationship between these two accounts of socially-situated knowledge and ignorance? Mills initially presented his account of active white

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

need to find a solution to closure-based sceptical arguments, and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since despite near-unanimity 5 to the contrary in the current literature, the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical

Kirk Lougheed

disagreement. I argue for the sceptical conclusion that the existence of widespread disagreement throughout the history of philosophy, and right up until the present day indicates that philosophers are highly unreliable at arriving at the truth. I will endorse the Unreliability Thesis: Philosophers are

Harald Thorsrud

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Pp. xviii + 283. isbn : 978-1-137-58478-6. Professor Nicgorski’s aim in this impressive but difficult book is to present a coherent, consistent, and original Ciceronian political philosophy, rooted in Cicero’s overall philosophical view—especially his skeptical