This paper is a second-order study of xinxue 心學 (the Neo-Confucian theory of mind from the Lu-Wang school). Having shown the difficulty of fitting the theory into philosophical or religious discourse, the paper will argue that it is more appropriate to see xinxue as a special variety of the “discourse of the infinite,” that is, discourse concerning the infinite, which will bring forth action. In this light, Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 and Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 theory on the internal experience of the unity of mind is to be seen less as description of mental life than as an effort to adhere to the spirit of Mencius: they insist on the unity of the internal experience of mind, without allowing its intensity to be reduced in the explanatory theory of lixue 理學 (theory of principles) espoused by Cheng Yi 程頤 and Zhu Xi 朱熹, and, in this way, strive to reaffirm Mencius’s proclamation about the goodness of human nature. More importantly, the discourse as a whole works to enhance the status of the sage as someone who embodies tianli 天理 (the highest moral principle of the universe). This mode of discourse has the performative force of bringing forth moral actions. The real subject of xinxue is not what Lu and Wang claim it to be, e.g. the essentially good human nature or the infinite moral mind. Rather, the subject of xinxue is that which reveals itself through a series of effortful discursive activities and in the moral practice thereby produced. The subject of xinxue that emerges from this continuous process of striving is a special subject even within the Confucian tradition, whose attention is directed mainly towards the internal experience of the unity of mind. This subject threatens to interrupt the intellectual as well as socio-political operations established by lixue, and therefore engenders a series of conflicts.
Johannes Stoffers S.J.
The inquiry analyses how Fichte rejects the reproach of founding the Wissenschaftslehre from the perspective of the individual I-subject in his lectures about the facts of consciousness (Tatsachen des Bewusstseins), held in Berlin between 1810 and 1813. Instead it becomes clear that according to Fichte, the crucial instance of “I” has to be considered as transindividual. Its individualisation matters only as far as causal effects on material bound reality are concerned, while the individuals join again the absolute life’s unity by speculative thought and moral acting.
With the consideration of some issues in contemporary philosophy, this thesis attempts to analyze being, thinking and language as philosophical subjects, and clear up the multiple meanings for each of them. It will also inquire the traditional methods in both Chinese and Western philosophy, and those in contemporary thinking. Finally, it puts forward a theory of “the critique without principles”. The thesis aims to explore a new way to solve the problems of contemporary philosophy by changing its subjects and methods.
Kakehashi Akihide’s Phenomenology of Matter
‘zenshizenshiteki katei’ no shisō e” Following the dominant Kyoto School philosophers such as Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime, who attempted in the early 1920s to grasp the structural logic of the subject, the subsequent generation of thinkers of this moment in modern Japanese thought, trained in the late 1920s to
down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs…and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces. 14 Due to this peculiar dynamic, capitalist humanity as a whole is subject to a permanent change in all aspects of its life, including
On the Philosophy of the Multiethnic State and Japanese Imperialism
international law were excluded from the international world and deprived of the protection of that law. Step by step these areas and their native inhabitants were “colonized” and subjected to the sovereignty of the European states that justified their reign over these extraterritories by appealing to
paraphrase (3), (3’) or (3’’) adds up something that does not appear in (1). Indeed, in comparison with the Chinese original (1), the paraphrase (3) brings back something that is omitted in (1): 13 it completes the second claim of (1) with its omitted subject. As suggested above, the paraphrase (2) also
Volume-editor Bo Mou
’s communicative practice. That is to say, these scholars assume that everyone else (including the ancient Chinese thinkers, who are the subject of these scholars’ inquiry) would also be aware of, and struck by, the same distinctive grammatical features of their language, as these scholars are. These scholars
Tao Xingzhi, Ji Linying, Zhang Xin, Xin Nan and Chen Lijuan
on how much the students in the elementary school liked or disliked the subjects. There were some investigations on one specific kind of education, which had great influence on the improvement of education. For example, in the eighth and ninth year of the Republic of China, the Chinese Vocational
yosen mirai (予先未来), which might be translated as “preemptive future,” or futur antérieur , a subject I will discuss later. 22 In this way, Tanabe conceives of dialectic in terms of time: dialectic as temporality, or temporality as dialectic. Here Tanabe does not follow the traditional dichotomy