Edited by Martijn Blaauw
Of the extant contextualist theories of knowledge, attributer contextualism (that is, the type of contextualism that makes the context of the attributer of knowledge crucial in determining whether a subject knows a proposition) has been discussed the most. The papers in the present collection continue this focus on attributer contextualism, and offer a fairly critical treatment of this theory. Nevertheless, a number of papers also outline new types of contextualism. What results is a collection of papers that, though negative towards attributer contextualism, for the most part is sympathetic towards contextualism in general.
Dedicated to Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Edited by Karel Novotny, Pierre Rodrigo, Jenny Slatman and Silvia Stoller
Contributors include: Alexei Chernyakov (†), Jagna Brudzińska, Universität Köln, IFiS PAN Warschau, Nicola Zippel, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Philosophy, Karel Novotný, Faculty of Humanities, Charles University of Prague, James Mensch, Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Annabelle Dufourcq, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Juho Hotanen, University of Helsinki, Silvia Stoller, Universität Wien, Pierre Rodrigo, Université de Bourgogne, Dijon, Antonino Firenze, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Shaun Gallagher, University of Memphis, Department of Philosophy, Kwok-ying Lau, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Monika Murawska, The Academy of Fine Arts, Warsaw, Irene Breuer, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Mauro Carbone, Université “Jean Moulin” Lyon 3, Faculté de philosophie, László Tengelyi, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Björn Thorsteinsson, University of Oceland, Institute of Philosophy, Mikkel B. Tin, Telemark University College, Porsgrunn, Tamás Ullmann, ELTE University of Budapest, Institute of Philosophy, Johann P. Arnason, La Trobe University, Melbourne; Charles University, Faculty of Humanities, Prague, Michael Staudigl, Vienna University, Department of Philosophy, Suzi Adams, Flinders University, Adelaide
Desmond Paul Henry
A proposition containing an adjectival predicate has customarily been described as one which predicates some quality of its subject; thus “William is white” is said to attribute whiteness to William. The concrete adjectival form in such a situation was sometimes said (e.g. by Boethius) to be derived from the corresponding abstract (as “white” from whiteness, “just” from justice, and so on), thus enabling the subject in question to be “denominated” from the abstract by means of the concrete. The quality is then said to be predicated of its subject in a denominative or paronymous fashion. Involved here also is the shaky assumption that adjectives may indeed be distinguished from substantives on the basis of the former’s correlation with available abstract forms which the latter lack, but this need not concern us here.
A reconstruction of Johnson’s main contributions to philosophy is provided. Johnson’s theories are grounded on his distinction between “substantives” and “adjectives”, which governs the oppositions between (1) particular and universal, (2) determinandum and determinans in thought, (3) acts of separation and discrimination, (4) subject and predicate, (5) thing and quality, (6) substance and determination, (7) proposition and fact, (8) external and internal relations, (9) extension and intension. While substantives divide between continuants and occurrents, adjectives are fundamentally distinguishable into determinables and determinates. The immediate (Stout, Broad) and later (Prior, Carnap, Searle, Armstrong, Hautamäki and Johansson) reception of Johnson’s distinction between determinables and determinates is also discussed.