Parmenides’ Modal Fallacy Frank A. Lewis University of Southern California, School of Philosophy, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0451, USA ﬂ firstname.lastname@example.org Abstract In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argumentbyelimination to select the correct “way of inquiry” from a pool of two, the ways of is and
in one of his exoteric writings now lost to us. The chapter cites Eudoxus, and it is at least a possibility that Eudoxus used a similar argumentbyelimination that also relied on TED, yet with a different goal, namely, to demonstrate the higher rank of pleasure compared to virtue, as part of his
are no reasons at all. I don’t doubt that this is so. Yet I find myself unable to believe Streumer’s conclusion for the much more mundane reason that I find his arguments for it to be unconvincing. In essence, Streumer’s argument for the error theory is an argumentbyelimination. He argues, against
nothing more than an argumentbyelimination disqualifying groups (A)-(D) as genuine goods on the grounds that they all require the presence of something else (viz. wisdom) in order to produce benefit. The difficulty is that this by itself says nothing about why wisdom should be accorded any better
passage [B], though the difficulties start in [A]. According to the deflationary reading, the regress is designed to show that thoughts and desires have their source beneath the level of conscious psychic activity. On this interpretive line, the regress sets up an argumentbyelimination, first by
freedom is the only genuine alternative for a priori principles that cannot concern happiness, but Kant does not fully spell out such an argument in “Theory and Practice.” Such an argumentbyelimination might in any case not seem that compelling to someone to whom the ultimate value of happiness is
indivisibles or points (see Euclid’s definition: a point is that of which there is no part).
On this ‘argumentbyelimination’ for potential parts, see Holden, Architecture of Matter , 125.
Digby’s demonstration might appeal to Aristotle’s authority: in De generatione et corruptione I
, or an argumentbyelimination, what in classical logic is termed a disjunctive syllogism. One rules out all but one of the logically possible accounts of relations of similarity, so that only inheritance from a putative common ancestor remains ” (Harrison 2003:215; cf. also Aikhenvald & Dixon 2001b
luck or coincidence.) If then, these seem either to be coincidental results or to be for something, and they cannot be coin- cidental or chance result, they are for something ( ἕνεκα του ) ( Physics II, 8, 198b34- 199a7). Aristotle’s argumentbyelimination is fairly simple, and not hard to para
-of-produce from producer in Russia defined the structure not just as ‘exploitative’ (in their terms) but also as specifically capitalist , they rely mainly on argument-by-elimination that it was neither slave nor feudal. In their range of alternatives to be eliminated, they exclude, without explanation, the other