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hand, connote things. What is connoted by a general term is a property which the objects falling under the term are related to by virtue of having it ( τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντα are such properties). Keywords Aristotle’s Categories , general terms, said of a subject, being in a subject Einleitung Es gibt

In: Phronesis

the crucial notion of the whole proof, ‘being in a subject’ ( in subiecto esse ), comes from Aristotle’s Categories . Aristotle defines substance (οὐσία) negatively as that which is neither in a subject nor said of a subject, i.e. which is neither an accident nor a universal ( Cat. 5, 2a11

In: Phronesis
Author: G.E.L. Owen

97 Inherence G. E. L. OWEN ften in the Categories and once in the Topics Aristotle draws a distinction between being in a subject and being said, or predicated, of a subjecl (Cat. 1 a 20-b 9, 2 a ll-14, 2a27-b6, 2 b 15-17, 3 a 7-32, 9 b 22-24 ; Post?yed. 11 b 38-12 a 17, 14 a 16-18 ; T op.127 b

In: Phronesis

’s distinction between ‘being-said of a subject’ and ‘being-in a subject,’ 38 between substance and accident and between universal and particular: 39 ‘man’ … is thought of as ‘substance,’ 40 because man is not in a subject and not an accident. And ‘man’ is conceived as universal

In: Oriens
Author: Robert Heinaman

that it is fair to assume that the positions of the Topics and the Categories coincide on this matter since the Topics (alone among Aristotle's other works) retains the distinction between being in a subject and being said of a subject (127bl-4). Other important parallels support this assumption: (i

In: Phronesis

-9, he writes: "Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them being in a subject - the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject." " At 4 a 10-17, he mentions "a colour which is

In: Phronesis

distinguishes the accident’s being from the accident’s essence. An accident depends naturally upon a sub- ject for both its being and its essence. But the subject is external to the accident’s essence. So neither the substance nor the property of being in a subject is part of an accident’s essence. The

In: Vivarium

patient, whereas the immaterial reception of F in a patient is that in which F has a distinct mode of being in the agent and in the patient. The relevant forms are inhering forms so that their mode of being is a mode of being in a subject. As we have seen, for Aquinas, it is the nature of the subject that

In: Vivarium

predicated. In the first place, it is noteworthy that the phrase in the passage that reads “with regard to those things which are in a subject, it is generally the case that their name is not predicated of the subject” does not deny that being in a subject could give way to a predication. It only points

In: Vivarium
Author: Roberto Pinzani

follows he goes further, arguing that status is not a thing: 23 Being man is not a man nor some other thing, if we look carefully, just like not being in a subject, or not allowing contraries, or not allowing more or less, are not things, yet however they are that in which, according to Aristotle, all

In: The Problem of Universals from Boethius to John of Salisbury