Based on China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data, China’s Gini Coefficient stood at 0.61 in 2010, above the global average of 0.44, according to the World Bank. The high Gini Coefficient represents a large income disparity of the country. It is understandable that a high Gini is common in fast-growing economies and can be reduced through government’s transfer payments given the experience of OECD countries. This paper illustrates the breakdown of China’s Gini, regional, rural and urban differences in household income. Specifically, it is found that poor health, insufficient social welfare and low education level are the main reasons for poverty of rural households. This paper also provides solutions to reduce the Gini coefficient. In the short term, China government can invest more on social insurance and implement large-scale transfer payments. The figure shows that China government has sufficient financial sources to strengthen secondary distribution to subsidize the low-income group. In the long term, government can increase overall educational level and reduce the opportunity inequality to narrow the income gap.
Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance SWUFE
This paper uses Chinese urban and rural panel data for 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (except Tibet and Taiwan) on the consumption of Chinese urban and rural households in 1995–2005, by constructiong a random effect model, to analyze the impact of sources of household’s consumption demand on the Chinese economy. The quantitative analysis reveals that the per capita disposable income of households is highly relevant in explaining households’ per capita consumption expenditure, in these eleven years, and that China’s consumption function was fairly stable. On the basis of flow of funds accounts (barter transaction) data in 1992–2004, the paper further reveals that, since 1997–1998, China’s consumer demand remains in the doldrums because of the following distribution and redistribution process of the national income: The Government’s share of total income and disposable income is becoming ever larger, while the share of households is declining. Aside from the result that a rise in the burden of personal tuition has a negative impact on per capita consumption demand for urban households, we have not found that housing reform or medical expenses significantly reduce consumer demand in China. We believe that low household consumption demand is caused mainly by the income redistribution between households, government, and corporations rather than the inequality in income distribution across households.
Jin Song and Shi Li
Along with advances in urban state-owned enterprise reform, fast growth of private sector and changes in the wage structure, earnings inequality in urban China has been increasing. Using data from the 1988 and 2007 waves of the urban household survey conducted by China Household Income Project, this paper attempts to examine the impact of the change in ownership structure on earnings distribution in urban China. We find that developing non-state-owned enterprises (nonSOEs) or privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) enlarge earnings inequality, but the difference in earnings level between the two sectors is small. Although workers in SOEs receive higher income than in nonSOEs, the difference is more caused by endowment difference rather than coefficient differences. Introducing market power to wage determination system is more influential to the rising earnings inequality which leads more rewards on working experience and educational attainment.
Juan Yang and Shi Li
We estimate the impact of rustication on sent-down cohorts during the decade period of the Cultural Revolution, relying on econometric methods and policy reviewing. The data used from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) for the years 1995 and 2002 show that the average income of sent-down cohorts is higher than those who were not sent-down, which seems to conflict with the human capital theory that predicts that education increases future expected returns. This paper separates the impact of ability, family background, and policies on intellectual youth and finds that their rustication had a significant negative effect for the sent-down cohorts. Correction for sent-down cohorts’ working experience from the year they went to the countryside decreases the income inequality among low-income sent-down cohorts, and compensates for the negative effects of the sent-down experience.
Zhuoshun Xu and Leshun Xu
A consensus is still to be reached regarding the relationship between trade, growth, and the environment in either the existing theoretical models or previous empirical analyses. By using a Sino-Korean case study, we expect this work to contribute to the theoretical and empirical knowledge of the relationship between trade, growth and the environment. In this paper, four types of simulation are executed by applying a Sino-Korea CGE model. The results reveal that an increasing volume of bilateral trade boosts the real GDP at a decreasing rate. Different degrees in the volume of increase of bilateral trade produce welfare gains for Chinese households, i.e. more household spending. Welfare increases at a decreasing rate when the degree of bilateral trade growth increases less stringently, while in Korea there are welfare losses (less household consumption) when the bilateral trade target becomes increasingly stringent. Moreover, the investment gains in the economy tend to rise more sharply as the degree of bilateral trade growth increases less stringently in China. The investment tends to decrease at a proportional rate when the target bilateral trade volume becomes more stringent and the changes in the gross investment become more significant in Korea. In addition, the aggregate production shows a tendency to increase at a proportional rate with a more stringent target bilateral trade volume and when there are considerable changes in gross production. Furthermore, the impact of most production sectors can benefit China, but have a negative impact on Korea. Meantime, the simulations highlight that import growth increases carbon emissions at a decreasing rate, and export growth increases carbon emissions. According to our policy findings, policy makers should be advised to consider the third trade policy (Scenario c), which maintains a reasonable economic growth but at the expense of investment and welfare.
In The China Population and Labor Yearbook, Volume 3 | ISBN: 9789004182448 The professed function of the Chinese household registration (hukou) system formed in the late 1950s is to register the population separately in rural and urban areas. Namely, the rural-urban distinguished birthplace
written by Zheng Yefu, professor of the Department of Sociology, Renmin University of China and published in the Guangming Daily on August 9, 1994 sounded the bugle of that debate. In that article, Zheng Yefu objected to the ownership of private cars by Chinese households, and believed that the wise
Bryan S. Turner
-class family is to hire domestic servants to manage the household and the children while both parents are fully employed. Hence, the successful Chinese household is typically sustained by the exploitation of the labour of Filipino maids. Despite pronatalist strategies, these policies have failed in the sense
.5% 具有工作合同、10% 有医疗保障、15% 有退休福利（根据后来更精确的数据, 这些推测其实偏高—见表11.1）。大多数要么承包大企业的工作或在小规模的非正规企业内工作, 要么就是自雇的个体户,一般都归属 “劳务关系”, 不会得到国家劳动法规和工会的保护。因为不具备城市居民身份, 他们只能负担更高的医药费用和子女的 “择校” 教育费用。在全国每年70万工伤受害者中, 他们毋庸说占了最大多数。这些基本事实也可见于众多较小规模的研究。 9 以上事实在一份国际调查中得到进一步证实。这是一个由国外学者和中国社会科学院共同组成的（1988、1995 和 2002 年三次调查中的）第三次 “中国家庭收入调查”（“Chinese
Joint Efforts to Control Contraband Along the Russia–China Border at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century
crabs and sea-cucumbers ( trepangs ), over there [they] plant poppy and extract opium, and so on. Each Chinese household— fanza —has another sort of business: pearl diving, oil extraction from herbs, making hanshin , 2 collecting milk vetch and so on. They can find a source of wealth anywhere. The