Search Results

Author: John Greco

1 Introduction In this excellent book, Duncan Pritchard returns to the topic of external world skepticism, proposing a bifurcated response that supersedes his previous treatments in Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford University Press

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Heather Logue

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. x + 170. isbn 978-0-19-955791-2. Duncan Pritchard’s book is after what he calls the “holy grail” of epistemology (1): a view that breaks the impasse between epistemic internalism and externalism by reconciling their main insights. In particular

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Drew Johnson

problem for rationally grounded knowledge based on the principle that rationally grounded knowledge is closed under known deduction, and which is structurally similar to the moral skeptical problem presented in Section 1. I then explain how hinge epistemology (taking Duncan Pritchard’s [2012, 2015

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

1. Introduction In a series of recent articles, Duncan Pritchard (2007, 2008, 2009) has attempted to defend John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy (adumbrated, for example, in McDowell 1994 , 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, and, most recently, in 2009) against a number of influential criticisms, most

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Chris Ranalli

1 Introduction Many contemporary epistemologists have turned to hinge epistemology —the epistemology of the ‘hinge commitments’ featured in Wittgenstein’s (1969) On Certainty— in order to overcome the problem of radical scepticism. 1 In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2016a

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Daniel Immerman

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, 264 pp. In this innovative, clearly written, and wide-ranging book, Duncan Pritchard 1 offers a new response to skepticism. In the course of doing so, he argues that it is superior to a number of competing responses to skepticism currently on offer

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Aidan McGlynn

The Routledge Companion to Epistemology . Edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard. London: Routledge, 2011. Pp. xxiii + 911. ISBN 978-0-415-96219-3. The core remit of contemporary epistemology at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century remains much as it was at the end

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Thomas Lockhart

epistemological disjunctivism which has been defended by Duncan Pritchard ( 2012; 2015 ). Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism does not allow us to rule out the random demon hypothesis. 3 The difference lies in McDowell’s insistence—absent in Pritchard’s version of epistemological disjunctivism

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Tommaso Piazza

1 Introduction Epistemological Disjunctivism ( ed ) is the view, championed by Duncan Pritchard (2012) , that when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that P, one’s epistemic support for believing P is constituted by S’s factive state of seeing that P. It is an alleged virtue of ed

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism