In this excellent book, DuncanPritchard returns to the topic of external world skepticism, proposing a bifurcated response that supersedes his previous treatments in Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford University Press
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. x + 170. isbn 978-0-19-955791-2.
DuncanPritchard’s book is after what he calls the “holy grail” of epistemology (1): a view that breaks the impasse between epistemic internalism and externalism by reconciling their main insights. In particular
problem for rationally grounded knowledge based on the principle that rationally grounded knowledge is closed under known deduction, and which is structurally similar to the moral skeptical problem presented in Section 1. I then explain how hinge epistemology (taking DuncanPritchard’s [2012, 2015
In a series of recent articles, DuncanPritchard (2007, 2008, 2009) has attempted to defend John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy (adumbrated, for example, in McDowell 1994 , 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, and, most recently, in 2009) against a number of influential criticisms, most
Many contemporary epistemologists have turned to hinge epistemology —the epistemology of the ‘hinge commitments’ featured in Wittgenstein’s (1969)
On Certainty— in order to overcome the problem of radical scepticism.
In his recent work, DuncanPritchard (2016a
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, 264 pp. In this innovative, clearly written, and wide-ranging book, DuncanPritchard
offers a new response to skepticism. In the course of doing so, he argues that it is superior to a number of competing responses to skepticism currently on offer
The Routledge Companion to Epistemology . Edited by Sven Bernecker and DuncanPritchard. London: Routledge, 2011. Pp. xxiii + 911. ISBN 978-0-415-96219-3.
The core remit of contemporary epistemology at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century remains much as it was at the end
epistemological disjunctivism which has been defended by DuncanPritchard ( 2012; 2015 ). Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism does not allow us to rule out the random demon hypothesis.
The difference lies in McDowell’s insistence—absent in Pritchard’s version of epistemological disjunctivism
Epistemological Disjunctivism ( ed ) is the view, championed by DuncanPritchard (2012) , that when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that P, one’s epistemic support for believing P is constituted by S’s factive state of seeing that P. It is an alleged virtue of ed