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Author: Annalisa Coliva

Moderatism) but an engagement with Humean skepticism too. As I understand it, that form of skepticism is first and foremost a challenge concerning the rationality of the assumptions on which the basic practice of forming justified beliefs by means of perceptual experiences is based. Indeed, Hume eventually

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

The paper presents the key themes of my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the justification of basic laws of inference.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Giorgio Volpe

recognition that epistemic rationality extends to “those unwarrantable assumptions that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible in the first place” ( Coliva 2015 : 129) brings with it a response to Humean scepticism: … the notion of epistemic rationality shared by sceptics and non sceptics

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

. Wittgenstein’s response to Humean scepticism, Coliva argues, is that it is nonsensical because it is irrational . A Cartesian sceptic, modeled on considerations put forth in Descartes’s First Meditation, forms a hypothesis (like the fact that one may be dreaming or a brain in a vat). Our sensory experience

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

(empirical) 39 Hinge epistemology (local) 39, 44–47 Hinge epistemology (transcendental) 27, 39–41, 44–47, 51 Horwich, Paul 79–80, 82 Huemer, Michael 176, 187, 191 Humean scepticism 123–125 I–II–III argument 6–9 Imagining 222 Incommensurability 102, 106 Inductive scepticism 10 Inferential justification 171

(empirical) 39 Hinge epistemology (local) 39, 44–47 Hinge epistemology (transcendental) 27, 39–41, 44–47, 51 Horwich, Paul 79–80, 82 Huemer, Michael 176, 187, 191 Humean scepticism 123–125 I–II–III argument 6–9 Imagining 222 Incommensurability 102, 106 Inductive scepticism 10 Inferential justification 171

Author: Peter S. Fosl

world defines the radical depth of Humean skepticism (T 12.1.16). Robison writes: “Hume’s point … is that the essential features of the human mind are such that the very conditions that make us suppose the existence of external objects make us unreasonable. …Hume means to show that the constitution of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

confidence. Since these and "... analogous difficulties hold for all the sciences (and also for ordinary thought)," Husserl asks: ... should we return to the viewpoint of Humean scepticism and extend it further than its great originator did, to mathe- matics and all "a priori" sciences as well? We turn in

In: Research in Phenomenology
Author: James S. Taylor

horror at her impending mortality. While such a person does not believe that her death will be a harm to her, she nevertheless cannot help affectively responding to it as though she does. Similarly, one can image a person who has embraced a neo-Humean skepticism concerning objective values, and yet who

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Hans Fink

, however, be prepared to let equality rather than justice be the central political value. 268 Book Reviews / Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009) 266–272 Th e book fi nishes on a note of cheerful Humean scepticism. It is well worth it to engage in science and philosophy to gain deeper rational insight

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy