Editors: Uwe Meixner and Rochus Sowa
The purpose of this collection of eleven essays on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is not to offer a comprehensive overview of Husserl’s philosophy. Of his many themes, only a selection is covered in this volume. But the collection is of interest for anyone in touch with the current philosophy of mind – which has undergone a remarkable broadening of its perspective: now, not only the causal and functional, but also the, broadly speaking, phenomenological and intentional aspects of the mind are being given what is due to them. Accompanying this broadening, there is a rediscovery – which for many philosophers from the analytic tradition means: a first discovery – of Husserlian phenomenology. The centre of this collection is formed by the five essays on Husserl’s views on perceptual experience and perceptual justification. These central essays are preceded by an essay on apprehension and an essay on motivation (both important Husserlian notions), and are followed by an essay on empathy and an essay on emotions (two Husserlian topics that are all too often neglected). The first essay of the collection presents, in a comprehensive and detailed way, complementarism as an alternative to Husserl’s classical phenomenological approach, transcendental reduction. The last essay concerns the issue of collective unity in Kant and Husserl, an ontological issue that is crucial for all transcendental philosophy. All of the eleven essays are new and have undergone a peer-review process. The authors: Audrey L. Anton, Carleton B. Christensen, Jasper Doomen, John J. Drummond, Richard Foley, Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Michael Groneberg, George Heffernan, Hans-Ulrich Hoche, Burt C. Hopkins, Ansten Klev, Helga Meier, Manuel Lechthaler, Sophie Loidolt, Filip Mattens, Verena Mayer, Sean McAleer, Tommaso Piazza, Alexander Reutlinger, Adriane A. Rini, Sara L. Uckelman, Philip J. Walsh, Christian Wirrwitz, Kristina Zuelicke

Husserl is well known as a defender of essences, properties, and other ‘abstract’ entities. His acceptance of these entities forms a core part of his philosophical system—for pure phenomenology itself is to be a “science of the Essential Being of things” (1913, §18), an “eidetic science, as the

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Ausgewählte Schriften
Author: Darian Meacham

phenomenological analyses might be better placed, she rolls her eyes and saunters off in precisely that mysterious way that fills me with devotion. I make a mental note to rethink Husserl’s role in my romantic life. Consider this a rather personal introduction to the phenomenological problem of “style.” The idea

In: Research in Phenomenology
Author: Andrea Marchesi

What prompted Husserl’s inquiry into the nature of intentionality is well known: from Brentano he inherits the idea that a crucial task of philosophy is to focus on experiences, 1 which according to the Brentanian view are necessarily intentional; from Bolzano he inherits the burden of

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Andrea Staiti

Introduction – The New Husserl as the Old Husserl Read Anew In a self-portrayal written for a philosophical encyclopedia in 1937, just a few months before his death, Husserl characterizes his earlier book Ideas I as “the actual fundamental writing of constitutive phenomenology” where “the

In: Research in Phenomenology

Edmund Husserl’s philosophical inquiries into the topic of time have proven one of the most thought-provoking and influential of such endeavours in the history of Western thought (Husserl 1991, 1962, 215–219). In many ways, some philosophical developments found in momentous thinkers such as

In: Journal of the Philosophy of History