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Author: Ali Hasan

I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the explanationist strategy of Laurence BonJour and Jonathan Vogel. It is an improved, more compelling defense, for at least two reasons. First, the attention to spatial properties, and in particular to what I call perspectival projections, makes the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis much more vivid and concrete. Second, the argument preserves and elucidates much that seems correct in the explanationist arguments others have offered while avoiding significant problems and shortcomings.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Kevin McCain

rwh . One of the most prominent supporters of the Explanationist Response, Jonathan Vogel, has argued on a number of occasions that the rwh has an explanatory advantage over all skeptical rivals (see Vogel 1990 , 2005, 2008). A key part of his strategy is to argue that the rwh can appeal to

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Daniel Immerman

that P is sensitive. 2 This paper will focus on a putative set of counterexamples to Sensitivity offered by Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel. These authors hold that you cannot sensitively believe that a particular one of your beliefs is not false. 3 For instance, according to

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Editors: Kevin McCain and Ted Poston
The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations represents the cutting-edge of research on underexplored skeptical challenges, dimensions of the skeptical problematic, and responses to various kinds of skepticism. The thirteen newly commissioned essays, edited by Kevin McCain and Ted Poston, demonstrate that despite its long history philosophical reflection on skepticism and the challenges it poses is alive and well. The essays in The Mystery of Skepticism enhance our understanding of skepticism by breathing new life into old debates and sparking new ones. The Mystery of Skepticism will shape discussions of skepticism for years to come.
Author: John Turri

,” Peter Graham off ers a new taxonomy of theories of justifi cation. In “Truth Tracking and the Problem of Refl ective Knowledge,” Joe Salerno defends Nozick’s truth-tracking condition on knowl- edge from well-known criticisms leveled by Jonathan Vogel and Ernest Sosa, arguing that they trade on a subtle

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Ted Poston

perception can justify belief independently of any warranted beliefs about the conditions of perception. This section features essays by Elia Zardini, Brian Weatherson, Jonathan Vogel, José L. Zalabardo, Alan Millar, Susanna Siegel and Nicholas Silins. The second section “The Dependency of the Senses

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: James R. Beebe

, Jonathan Vogel (“Is Cartesian Skepticism Too Cartesian?”) considers attempts to rebut Cartesian skepticism that proceed by rejecting various Cartesian doctrines that are thought to underlie the skeptical challenge. These doctrines include the following: (1) One’s beliefs about the external world are

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Aidan McGlynn

devices in finding the relevant discussion. Moreover, many important proposals simply aren’t covered at all. For example, aside from Richard Fumerton’s references to his own view in his article on externalist responses to skepticism, contemporary internalist responses to skepticism—Jonathan Vogel’s recent

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Kevin McCain

, Rich Feldman, Ted Poston, and Jonathan Vogel for helpful discussion of these issues. I am particularly indebted to James Beebe, Ali Hasan, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Mark Walker

1 / e ) > P( h 2 / e ). (2006: 200) It will be convenient to use Hazlett’s formulation in what follows, but it is worth saying something about different formulations of the underdetermination principle. The following comes from Jonathan Vogel: UP 1 If q is a competitor to p, then a

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism