This paper urges that Laurence BonJour fails to make the case for an all-out a priori fallibilism “as clear as anything philosophical could be.” Firstly, the paper introduces a number of distinctions of vital importance to the relevant debate. On the basis of those distinctions, it is argued that several interesting a priori infallibilist claims are not targeted by BonJour’s central a priori fallibilist arguments. After this, the paper confronts BonJour’s arguments on their own terms, attempts to fairly regiment them, and ensuingly brings out their weaknesses, thus regimented.
arrangement of fields, particles, forces, or what have you. The Berkelean God hypothesis and evil demon hypothesis will have to invoke items corresponding to these spatial “objects” and, in addition to these, posit a robust intention to deceive.
Thanks to LaurenceBonJour, Richard Fumerton, Evan
Many philosophers have equated the denial of foundationalism with a call for coherentist approaches to epistemology. I think such equations are spurious, and to show why this is so I contrast the views of a paradigmatic coherentist with an antifoundationalist alternative. This article examines the coherentism of Laurence BonJour with an eye toward the way in which BonJour’s views fail to fully adopt the insights of their Sellarsian roots. In particular, I argue that BonJour’s view endorses the philosophy of mind that Wilfrid Sellars criticized in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) – which itself may be no sin (though I believe it is), but is a problem given BonJour’s express sympathies with Sellars and EPM. I begin by contrasting the approaches taken by BonJour in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge and by Sellars in EPM, arguing that one could deny foundationalism without, thereby, becoming a coherentist.
appeal to the familiar possibilities of massive deception involving evil demons, brains in vats, and so on. The first is the charge from infallibilists such as LaurenceBonJour that no sufficiently clear and non-arbitrary threshold for justification has been articulated by fallibilists and thus that
this. LaurenceBonjour remarks that by Strawson’s lights “the notion of reasonable belief and the correlative notion of strong evidence must apparently be understood in ways that have nothing to do with likelihood of truth, presumably by appeal to standards of reasonableness and strength of evidence
hypothesis has a sufficiently high probability. The support for the final premise comes from Beebe’s discussion of the problems facing two attempts to offer such accounts of a priori probability by supporters of the Explanationist Response. Beebe argues that both Alan Goldman’s (1988) and LaurenceBonJour’s
which has applicability to anything other than analytic propositions. 15 The whole schema of the transcendental deduction (in both its objective and subjective components) was devised specifically to justify the existence 13 LaurenceBonjour has correctly pointed out, however, that Quine has
); Richard King (1998) proposes an account according to which early Yogācāra was more continuous with Abhidharma, especially Sautrāntika. Willis and King present alternatives to the historical narrative that Yogācāra was idealist from the time of Vasubandhu.
LaurenceBonJour claims that
. LaurenceBonJour finds three reasons why it is inadequate: it entails that epistemic justification requires an input from or contact with the world outside the system of beliefs; many alternative systems of belief can be invented, each of them entirely coherent; there is no clear connection between the