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Author: Frank Lewis

Parmenides’ Modal Fallacy Frank A. Lewis University of Southern California, School of Philosophy, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0451, USA fl Abstract In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct “way of inquiry” from a pool of two, the ways of is and

In: Phronesis
Volume Editors: Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max Urchs
The volume deals with ontological and semantical issues concerning things, facts and events. Ontology tells us about what there is, whereas semantics provides answers to how we refer to what there is. Basic ontological categories are commonly accepted along with basic linguistic types, and linguistic types are accepted as basic if and because they refer to acknowledged ontological categories. In that sense, both disciplines are concerned with structure - the structure of the world and the structure of our language.
An extended introduction overviews the topic as a whole, presenting in detail its history and the main contemporary approaches and discussions.
More than 20 contributions by internationally acknowledged scholars make the volume a comprehensive study of some very fundamental philosophical entities.

Phronesis 54 (2009) 440-441 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/003188609X12486562883336 Contents Volume 54 (2009) Note from the Editors ...................................................................... v Articles Frank A. Lewis Parmenides’ Modal Fallacy

In: Phronesis
Volume Editors: Jacek Jadacki and Jacek Paśniczek
“The influence of [Kazimierz] Twardowski on modern philosophy in Poland is all-pervasive. Twardowski instilled in his students a passion for clarity [...] and seriousness. He taught them to regard philosophy as a collaborative effort, a matter of disciplined discussion and argument, and he encouraged them to train themselves thoroughly in at least one extra-philosophical discipline and to work together with scientists from other fields, both inside Poland and internationally. This led above all [...] to collaborations with mathematicians, so that the Lvov school of philosophy would gradually evolve into the Warsaw school of logic [...]. Twardowski taught his students, too, to respect and to pursue serious research in the history of philosophy, an aspect of the tradition of philosophy on Polish territory which is illustrated in such disparate works as [Jan] Łukasiewicz’s ground-breaking monograph on the law of non-contradiction in Aristotle and [Władysław] Tatarkiewicz’s highly influential multi-volume histories of philosophy and aesthetics [...] The term ‘Polish philosophy’ is a misnomer [...] for Polish philosophy is philosophy per se; it is part and parcel of the mainstream of world philosophy – simply because [...] it meets international standards of training, rigour, professionalism and specialization.” – Barry Smith (from: “Why Polish Philosophy does Not Exist”)

Plato of the charge that this crucial argument turns on a fairly straight- forward modal fallacy. He also locates the argument in an important and lengthy tradition which includes Parmenides, Aristotle and Epicurus. To these ends, Hankinson begins by translating the passage and commenting on three

In: Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy

what can truly be said of the triangle can truly be said of the first element, although they are identi- cal. I call this argument "the modal fallacy." The connection with identity is explicit in the second of the arguments, and it is in his discussion of this argument that Aristotle introduces the

In: Phronesis
Author: Alison McIntyre

tomorrow make it false," then it does imply 4 but it is not implied by 2. The first interpretation would accuse Aristotle of a modal fallacy, something which Professor Frede argues that Aristotle does not commit. The second inter- pretation might put the gap in the right place: in the step from 2 to 3

In: Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy
Author: R.J. Hankinson

's texts.1 My aim in this paper is to offer an analysis of the argument as Plato presents it; to clear up, or if that sounds too implausible, at least to offer a reasoned reading of some of its unclarities and ambiguities; to acquit Plato of a straightforward modal fallacy of which he is sometimes accused

In: Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy

indivisibles in general, including extended indivisibles. If the analysis here offered is correct, the Presocratic Atomists are not guilty of the modal fallacy which J. Barnes hoists upon them. He claims (The Presocratic Philosphers, Vol. 2, p. 58) that the atomists move from 1. It cannot be the case that

In: Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy