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Amelia Hicks

Introduction Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge write: One danger that has not been lost on particularists is that their extremely ecumenical view of moral reasons for action threatens implausibly to ‘flatten the normative landscape’. After all, even if we think that in the right context

Shane Courtland

@tulane.edu Abstract Hobbesian accounts of public reason (provided by David Gauthier and Michael Ridge) are forced to face a tension that is presented for any theorist that toes the Hobbesian line. Th is ten- sion has been referred to as the “Hobbesian Dilemma.” On one horn, we are afraid that we might create a

Uri D. Leibowitz

account of morality without relying on exceptionless moral principles will be gravely jeopardized. And indeed, the chief argument in Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge’s [henceforth M&R] book-length critique of particularism is centred on the explanation of moral knowledge. According to M&R a generalist

Toby Svoboda

Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.

Thom Brooks

John Broome, Alison Hills, Onora O’Neill, Thomas Pink, Michael Ridge and Russ Shafer-Landau. The event will be open to the public and regis- tration details are available from the conference organizer, Fabian Freyen- hagen (our Reviews Editor). His email and postal addresses are listed on the inside

Thom Brooks

, Onora O’Neill, Thomas Pink, Michael Ridge and Russ Shafer-Landau. All three special issues will also contain papers submitted independently. These are a few of the exciting new developments with the Journal of Moral Philosophy you can expect to see in this volume. We hope that you will join us, both as

Series:

Edited by Thom Brooks

Ethics and moral philosophy is an area of particular interest today. This book brings together some of the most important essays in this area. The essays have all appeared recently in the Journal of Moral Philosophy, an internationally recognized leading philosophy journal. This book is divided into five sections: practical reason, particularism, moral realism, virtue ethics, and ethics and moral philosophy more generally.

Yong Li

Darwall presents a second-person perspective on interpersonal relationships. Niko Kolodny proposes a non-reductive approach to the normativity of partial relations. Michael Ridge discusses the extent of impartial concern. In the last chapter, David Estlund explores the issue of required impartial

David Merli

’s “Moral epistemology” discusses issues of deference and epistemic authority in moral epistemology, arguing that these raise issues not only for varieties of moral realism but for other meta-ethical commitments as well. And Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge’s “Aesthetics and particularism” is a very nice

Dan Baras

attitude to someone is to evaluate that attitude in accordance with the norms that apply to it” (p. 83) and argue that it poses serious challenges to the various metanormative anti-realism theories. Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge suggest a solution to a puzzle regarding the concept of ‘reason for action