1 Introduction Moore performed the proof of an external world, known as “Moore’s proof,” in his 1939 lecture “Proof of an External World.” The opening of Moore’s lecture quotes Kant’s problem of an external world where the Critique of Pure Reason famously declares lack of a solution to Kant
Part I Dogmatism, Conservativism, and the Mainstream Debate 1. Moore’s Proof There is something intellectually unsatisfying about G.E. Moore’s ( 1959 ) proof of the external world. However, it is not especially obvious just what it is about the Proof that fails to satisfy. No one outside
Two major arguments have been advanced for the claim that there is a transmission failure in G.E. Moore’s famous proof of an external world. The first argument, due to Crispin Wright, is based on an epistemological doctrine now known as ‘conservatism’. Proponents of the second argument, like Nicholas Silins, invoke probabilistic considerations, most important among them Bayes’ theorem. The aim of this essay is to defend Moore’s proof against these two arguments. It is shown, first, that Wright’s argument founders because one of its premises, viz., conservatism, invites scepticism and must therefore be rejected. Then the probabilistic argument is challenged, not because its formal part is dubious, but rather on the grounds that it incorporates an unconvincing philosophical claim as an implicit premise. Finally, the two most promising objections to dogmatism—the negation of conservatism—are repudiated.
Philip Atkins and Ian Nance
have explored the possibility that CA is question-begging , the possibility that CA exhibits transmission failure , and the possibility that CA is structurally inefficient . Interestingly, perhaps, each of these has been proposed as the correct classification of Moore’s Proof (MP), which is one of
Suppose one has a visual experience as of having hands, and then reasons as follows: (MOORE) (1) I have hands, (2) If I have hands an external world exists; (3) An external world exists. Suppose one’s visual experience gives one defeasible perceptual warrant, or justification, to believe (1) – that is, one’s experience makes it epistemically appropriate to believe (1). And suppose one comes to believe (1) on the basis of this visual experience. The conditional premise (2) is knowable a priori. And (3) can be established by modus ponens inference. If one reasons thus, say one’s engaged in (MOORE)-reasoning. What, if anything, is wrong with (MOORE)-reasoning? I consider two prominent responses to this question – the dogmatists’ and Crispin Wright’s. Each finds fault in (MOORE)-reasoning, but on different grounds. I argue Wright’s response faces a problem which is standardly only taken to be faced by dogmatists.
Keren Gorodeisky and Kelly Dean Jolley
had a similar effect, first for Clarke, and now for his readers: what we first guessed as points in Moore, we now know stars. Clarke named those stars in the paper he wrote. But while Clarke (1972) starts with Moore, Moore’s Proof (Moore 1993c) starts with Kant. Is there a sort of transitivity
Here I cast some doubt on Professor Coliva’s interpretive claim that Moore’s “Proof of an external world” is addressed to idealism, not skepticism, and explore the consequences for our understanding of the final paragraphs of the paper. In response to Professor Leite, I examine the disagreement between us on whether the global skeptical hypotheses can be refuted by ordinary evidence. Finally, after analyzing the logic of the skeptical argumentation, I attempt an answer to Professor Stroud’s question about the staying power of the representative theory of perception.
Articles M ark M c B ride The Dogmatists and Wright on Moore’s “Proof” 1 F rank B arel Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism 21 J ohn T urri Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory 83 J ill R usin Characterizing Skepticism’s Import 99 A dam C arter
Duncan Pritchard and Diego Machuca
reviews by Stéphane Marchand and Vicente Raga examine books on ancient and early modern skepticism. Forthcoming issues will include articles on Moore’s proof of the existence of the external world, Boghossian’s refutation of relativism, whether speech- act theory can refute Pyrrhonian skepticism, and
) cannot be rationally deployed to settle the question in favour of (3). Thus no warrant for, and so no knowledge of, (3) is acquired by (EK)-reasoning within the S-project. 11 Davies offers a like diagnosis of reasoning with G.E. Moore’s “Proof” of (knowledge of) the existence of an external world. 12