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Grotiana 31 (2010) 69–84 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187607510X540222 G R O T I A N A Vattel’s ‘Law of Nations ’ and the Principle of Non-Intervention Simone Zurbuchen IIEDH, University of Fribourg, Switzerland Email: Abstract Th e

In: Grotiana

ontologically. On that basis, this article contends that Russia’s conduct falls within the scope of the principle of non-intervention. Section 3 then goes on to assess whether Russia’s actions constitute permissible intervention because they were either consented to by Ukraine’s lawful authorities or because

In: International Community Law Review

of helping to ‘protect’ populations from atrocity crimes, highlighting the need for States to consider the consequences of their actions. The first part of this paper outlines the traditional application of the principle of non-intervention in relation to the provision of assistance to opposition

In: Global Responsibility to Protect

Council delivered its opinion on 20 December 2017, in which it advised that the proposal should not be adopted in its current form. Among the reasons stated in the Council’s opinion, one of the most explicit was that the proposed exception would be inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention under

In: Nordic Journal of International Law

Introduction Brazil has traditionally based its foreign policy on the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, which is similar to that of other Latin American states. Historically resistant to any kind of external interference, these countries have tended toward the

In: Global Responsibility to Protect

, mass media, and apologies, led to a re-examination of the conceptualisations of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, and ultimately to the development of R2P. 5 Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the failures of the international community to act in Rwanda and Kosovo

In: Journal of International Peacekeeping
With considerable insight and analysis, the editors and contributors to the book—the world’s leading ethicists, political scientists and international lawyers—investigate the use of force since the end of the Cold War and, simultaneously, what changes have or should occur with respect to sovereignty and the law in the 21st century.

Redefining Sovereignty has resulted from three groundbreaking workshops on international law and the use of force: the first was held in Rome soon after NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo; the second took place in Frankfurt after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan; and the third occurred in Columbus, Ohio after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Together, these and other uses of armed force since the end of the Cold War have raised new and challenging questions for the international law and policy on the regulation of armed conflict.

These questions are explored in the thoughtful text, including: With the end of superpower rivalry have these uses of force had a particular impact on the state system? Have they, for example, affected the concept of state sovereignty? Have they affected the legal regime on the use of force? By the time of the Iraq invasion in March 2003, had some uses of force long-considered prohibited by the principle of non-intervention become lawful? Did the use of force to protect human rights, to respond to terrorism, for arms control or to preempt future threats become lawful or if not lawful, somehow otherwise legitimate?

Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.
Self-determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention
The errors - military, political, and not least diplomatic - in the continuing unfolding of the Yugoslav tragedy over the decade since the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the final ending of the Cold War, offer certain lessons. It had been confidently predicted that the complex, multi-national Yugoslav state created by the World War I victors at Versailles in 1919, and continued by the post-World War II peace settlements, would not long survive Marshal Tito's death. As it happened, when the moment of truth arrived the concert of Western European powers had no clear and coherent plans ready for a rational brokering of the resulting problems of State Succession, including renewed federal or confederal structures, and peaceful and orderly transfer and relocation of civil populations if fragmentation and independence were to be the immediate policy options. The rush to a 'premature' State Recognition by one or more leading Western European political players, without having any congress of Berlin-style game-plan ready to guide and direct this, may have triggered the on-rush of political and military events that led, in quick succession, to the Bosnian and then the Kosovo tragedies of the 1990s.
The author, currently President of the Institut de Droit International and a jurisconsult and advisor, over the years, to international and national governmental authorities, examines consequences and challenges for International Law and Law-making, as we enter the new Millennium. Taking note of the antinomies and contradictions inherent in Classical International Law Categories like Territorial Integrity and the Self-determination of Peoples, the Non-Use-of-Force and Collective (regional) Self-Defence, the author considers, in particular, the direct conflict, in the case of both Bosnia and Kosovo, between the United Nations Charter principle of Non-Intervention and the claimed 'New' International Law principle of Humanitarian Intervention. The legally permissible modalities and structures and processes for exercise of Humanitarian Intervention, in accord with the United Nations Charter and also general International Law, are canvassed and weighed.
Author: Diana Kearney

Fed up with the decades-old violence plaguing the DRC, the UN Security Council broke new ground by granting peacekeepers an offensive mandate to pursue rebels rather than waiting to react in self-defence. This transformation in UN military operations alarmed several States, concerned over a perceived loss of sovereignty and a weakening of the principle of non-intervention. To allay these fears, Resolution 2098’s drafters incorporated a provision expressly assuring Member States that offensive peacekeeping tactics in the DRC would not generate precedent for future UN action. However, examining past UN practice and ‘slippery slope’ theory alike reveals that explicit disavowal of precedent cannot guarantee that offensive peacekeeping will not be used as a template for future UN action. In fact, the incorporation of such language may foster the generation of a slippery slope in UN peacekeeping, ultimately paving the way for increased scope of UN intervention in situations of gross human rights violations. The article concludes by proposing a framework for how actors can manipulate slopes to generate or slow precedent for future UN action.

In: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online