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hand, connote things. What is connoted by a general term is a property which the objects falling under the term are related to by virtue of having it ( τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντα are such properties). Keywords Aristotle’s Categories , general terms, said of a subject, being in a subject Einleitung Es gibt

In: Phronesis

69 "Predicable of" in Aristotle's Categories SHELDON MARC COHEN n their article "The One and the Many"' Gareth B. Matthews and I S. Marc Cohen explicated the notion of "said of a subject" in Aristotle's Categories thusly : ' (1) "o is said of a subject, x, if and only if, x is said to be a o

In: Phronesis

what is said and what is not said of a subject. In his commentary on the Categories , Boethius assimilates what is said and what is not said of a subject respectively with the universal and the particular, and what is and is not in a subject with the accident (understood as accidens

In: Vivarium
Author: L.M. De Rijk

. 2, 1 a 16-17). The latter group is the one discussed in this treatise. Its members, designated as 'things' or 'beings' (t6n onton, I a 20) are subdivided. Some are said of a subject (kath' hypokeimenou tinos), but are not present in any subject (en hypokei- menôi de oudeni), such as `rnan' is said

In: Vivarium
Author: Julia Annas

necessity and according to the theory, if Forms can be participated in then there must be Forms only of substances, since they are not participated in accidentally; a Form must be participated in insofar as it is not said of a subject. I mean, for example, if something participates in the original Double,4

In: Phronesis
Author: Roberto Pinzani

analytical one) and its range of application. Let us consider two key passages: Of things which are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (c

In: The Problem of Universals from Boethius to John of Salisbury

just what they are in virtue of being something different. So items which are not said of a subject I call ‘by themselves’, whereas those which are said of a subject I call ‘accidents’ (τὰ µὲν δὴ µὴ καθ᾿ ὑποκειµένου καθ᾿ αὑτὰ λέγω, τὰ δὲ καθ᾿ ὑποκειµένου συµβεβηκότα). 13 Thus, according to this

In: Phronesis
Author: Phil Corkum

substance – that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all – is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse. Th e species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also

In: Phronesis
Author: Roberto Pinzani

tradition of the commentators (including Categoriae decem ) simply reiterates the Aristotelian distinction; Scotus, however, offers his own opinion: I believe it is worthwhile to look into this issue: according to dialecticians all that is or is a subject, or (is said) of a subject, or (is said) of and is

In: The Problem of Universals from Boethius to John of Salisbury

’s distinction between ‘being-said of a subject’ and ‘being-in a subject,’ 38 between substance and accident and between universal and particular: 39 ‘man’ … is thought of as ‘substance,’ 40 because man is not in a subject and not an accident. And ‘man’ is conceived as universal

In: Oriens