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Author: Amelia Hicks

Introduction Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge write: One danger that has not been lost on particularists is that their extremely ecumenical view of moral reasons for action threatens implausibly to ‘flatten the normative landscape’. After all, even if we think that in the right context

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy

account of morality without relying on exceptionless moral principles will be gravely jeopardized. And indeed, the chief argument in Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge’s [henceforth M&R] book-length critique of particularism is centred on the explanation of moral knowledge. According to M&R a generalist

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy

Hutton David Hyams Dale Jamieson Karsten Klint Jensen Tziporah Kasachkoff Neil Levy Jennie Louise Jon Mahoney Jon Mandle Peter Markie Matt Matravers Cillian McBride Brian McElwee Sean McKeever Christopher McMahon Joseph Mendola Alex Miller Niklas Moller Timothy F. Murphy Chrispher Myers James Pattison

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy

Albert W. Dzur, Punishment, Participatory Democracy, & the Jury  668 Sean McKeever Books Received  673 Volume 12, No. 6 Articles Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past  677 Jason Hanna Whose Problem Is Non-Identity?  699 Paul Hurley

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: David Merli

’s “Moral epistemology” discusses issues of deference and epistemic authority in moral epistemology, arguing that these raise issues not only for varieties of moral realism but for other meta-ethical commitments as well. And Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge’s “Aesthetics and particularism” is a very nice

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Dan Baras

attitude to someone is to evaluate that attitude in accordance with the norms that apply to it” (p. 83) and argue that it poses serious challenges to the various metanormative anti-realism theories. Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge suggest a solution to a puzzle regarding the concept of ‘reason for action

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Robin Celikates

have to be understood this way—they can be formulated in a way that is not only compatible with holism but presupposes it (see also Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever, ‘What Does Holism have to do with Moral Particularism?’, Ratio 18 [2005], pp. 93-103). And even Dancy seems to admit that therefore

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Alan Thomas

and Ridge claim, to view this corollary of his or her position as a serious embarrassment. Unpacking the metaphor somewhat, the putative problem is that certain moral reasons seem, at their face value, directly to * Thanks to Kathryn Brown for her help with this paper. 1. Sean McKeever and Michael

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Simon Kirchin

content of that reason, something I mentioned above. Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge also concentrate on the idea of default valency but their aim is different from mine. They identify three possible readings of this notion and then argue that (i) the metaphysical reading is features. That is, there was

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Simon Kirchin

should reflect on exactly what sort of expla- nation is called for here. What particularists are asked for is an explanation, 10. See Dancy, EWP , ch. 6.6. I resist the temptation to comment on the paper by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge and defend the legitimacy of this notion. However, it should be

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy