Search Results

from Apology 30b2-4 summarises in aphoristic form an important aspect of Socrates’ philosophic message to the people of Athens. The aphorism is significant as a general statement of Socratic ethical belief and, moreover, one that purports to give the exact words Socrates spoke in his defence before

In: Mnemosyne
Author: Tomáš Hejduk

There are those among modern interpreters who affirm that Plato and Socrates were in sympathy with the poetry ascribed to Theognis, as to an archaic aristocratic criticising the unpardonable conditions of the new age. They claim that Plato’s thinking was “entirely consonant with traditional thought

In: The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition
Author: Ann Ward

and Plato’s Apology of Socrates . Sophocles’ tragedy and Plato’s dialogue are compared because both dramatize a process of self-discovery on the part of the protagonist that is grounded in human reason. Moreover, their fellow citizens recognize Oedipus and Socrates for their superior human wisdom

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought
Author: Thomas Miller

1 Introduction After Socrates presents his first three arguments in the Phaedo for the immortality of the soul, Simmias and Cebes each raise an apparently damaging objection. Phaedo, the narrator of the dialogue, describes to his friend Echecrates the despair that everyone present felt at

In: Phronesis

1. Introduction Early in Book II of the Republic (370c-372d), Socrates briefly depicts a city where each inhabitant contributes to the welfare of all by carrying out the role for which each is naturally suited. Citizens of the city are happy and contented, having all their basic needs met

In: Phronesis
Author: Holly Moore

1 The Interpretive Problem of the Refutation of Thrasymachus There can be no doubt that at the climax of Book One of the Republic Thrasymachus feels shamed, for Socrates describes the moment with reference to an unequivocal embodied sign: ‘And then I saw what I had not yet seen before

In: Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought
Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue assembles the most complete range of studies on Socrates and the Socratic dialogue. It focuses on portrayals of Socrates, whether as historical figure or protagonist of ‘Socratic dialogues’, in extant and fragmentary texts from Classical Athens through Late Antiquity. Special attention is paid to the evolving power and texture of the Socratic icon as it adopted old and new uses in philosophy, biography, oratory, and literature. Chapters in this volume focus on Old Comedy, Sophistry, the first-generation Socratics including Plato and Xenophon, Aristotle and Aristoxenus, Epicurus and Stoicism, Cicero and Persius, Plutarch, Apuleius and Maximus, Diogenes Laertius, Libanius, Themistius, Julian, and Proclus.

Abstract: In her recent paper, “How to Escape Indictment for Impiety: Teaching as Punishment in the Euthyphro,” G. Fay Edwards argues that if Socrates were to become Euthyphro’s student, this should count as the appropriate punishment for Socrates’ alleged crime. In this paper, we show (1) that the interpretation Edwards has proposed conflicts with what Socrates has to say about the functional role of punishment in the Apology, and (2) that the account Socrates gives in the Apology, properly understood, also provides the correct interpretation of what Socrates says in the Euthyphro about the role of instruction for wrongdoers.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Andrew Payne

Abstract: Socrates in the Apology takes an adventurous approach to belief. Although he lacks knowledge, he holds strong beliefs about virtue and the human good. These beliefs count as wisdom only if they are supported by the ability to explain why they are true, and Socrates lacks this ability. To understand why Socrates holds these beliefs, Gorgias 481c–482c is examined. He claims there always to say the same thing and to agree with himself. His beliefs allow him to maintain a stable core of harmonious beliefs. This provides some evidence of the truth of his beliefs and forms one aspect of his human wisdom.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Audrey Anton

There seems to be tension between portrayals of Socrates as both a committed philosopher and a pious man. For instance, one might doubt Socrates’ commitment to philosophy since he seems to irrationally defer to a daimonion. On the other hand, the fact that he challenges messages from Oracles (Apology 21–22) and the gods’ role concerning the origin of the pious (Euthyphro 10–15) draws into question Socrates’ piety. In this paper, I argue that Socratic piety and rationality are not only compatible, but they are also symbiotic. Socrates could not be rational without being pious, nor could he be pious without being rational because, for him, care and curiosity are intimately intertwined. In this regard, Socrates’ epistemology, when applied, resembles Karl Popper’s falsificationism. For Socrates, maintaining human wisdom amounts to regular purification of one’s belief-system. In addition, this maintenance is functionally identical to caring for one’s soul, which is morally imperative.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis