with the latter that there is nothing odd about such properties. What I very much like about Bart Streumer’s new book Unbelievable Errors
is that it seeks to navigate its course around this brick wall by developing a systematic inconsistency argument to the effect that normative properties
1 Introduction In his ambitious and exciting new book, Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. He then goes on to argue that the error theory is unbelievable—hence the title of the book. Though Streumer makes many controversial and
. Recently, Bart Streumer uses a more wide-ranging version of the first step of Jackson’s argument (although he rejects the second step). He expands this argument to cover not just moral properties, such as rightness and goodness, but all normative properties. So Streumer takes the first step of Jackson
1 Introduction In his challenging book, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements. A successful defense requires defeating all other metaethical views, including non-cognitivism and reductive realism. In this paper, I explore some avenues of response. I will focus on non
the book that they are compatible with different views about what makes a property normative or descriptive ( Streumer 2017 : 101–103).
Cognitivists think that normative judgments represent the world: they take these judgments to be beliefs that ascribe normative properties. Most cognitivists are
happens is not meant to show “why we don’t all come to believe Streumer’s conclusion when presented with his arguments.” I am trying to explain something more unusual: I am not trying to explain why not everyone is convinced by my arguments, but why someone who is convinced by my arguments when he or she
Hattiangadi endorses non-reductive realism but rejects (S).
She therefore thinks that the reduction argument fails to refute her view. If a normative claim is true and its truth does not depend on which objects have which descriptive properties, we can call it a fundamental normative truth ( Streumer
book that they are compatible with different views about what makes a property normative or descriptive ( Streumer 2017 : 101–103).
Cognitivists think that normative judgements represent the world: they take these judgements to be beliefs that ascribe normative properties. Most cognitivists are
Journal of Moral Philosophy is a peer-reviewed journal of moral, political and legal philosophy with an international focus. It publishes articles in all areas of normative philosophy, including pure and applied ethics, as well as moral, legal, and political theory. Articles exploring non-Western traditions are also welcome. The journal seeks to promote lively discussions and debates for established academics and the wider community, by publishing articles that avoid unnecessary jargon without sacrificing academic rigour. It encourages contributions from newer members of the philosophical community.
Journal of Moral Philosophy is published six times a year, in January, March, May, July, September and November. One issue per year is devoted to a particular theme and each issue will contain articles, discussion pieces, review essays and book reviews.