As part of the examination of some proposed definitions of knowledge, Plato in the Theaetetus presents several attempts to describe the nature of mental activities such as thinking and perceiving. Part of the richness and difficulty of Plato’s discussion derives from the fact
The ‘Secret Doctrine’ of Protagoras, Socrates tells us, was held in some form by nearly every wise man in the past, including Heraclitus and Homer ( Theaetetus 152c8-e9). 1 While it may be that only a fictional Protagoras ever held it, the Secret Doctrine ( sd ) is a
In this paper I will examine the relation between sensation and discursive reason ( dianoia ) in Neoplatonism. I will begin with a brief examination of sensation in Plato’s Theaetetus . After this, I will argue that in Plotinus and Proclus, our experience of the sensible world has unity and
Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate “cognition according to the definition and through the elements,” and a final cognition of how the thing’s many elements are united: only this last is πιστήμη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for πιστήμη and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius’ reading of “Socrates’ Dream,” its place in the Theaetetus’ larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels’s text of Simplicius. Diels’s emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates’ Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions.
This is the English version of this article translated by Patrick Hogan. The original Italian version was written by Lara Pagani and first published on 12/09/2005., Here is the Italian version of this entry., Name:Theaetetus | ΘεαίτητοςPlace of Origin:?Date:2nd c./6th c. CE (?), ↓ To Source List
The Case of Theaetetus 1 GOKHAN ADALIER A BSTRACT Any comprehensive interpretation of the Theaetetus has to provide answers to, among others, two very general questions concerning that dialogue: ÒWhat is PlatoÕs relation to the problems faced in the Theaetetus ?Ó and ÒWhat is the signi cance of
the waxen block and the aviary from Plato’s Theaetetus . The first part of the paper concentrates on Plotinus’ reception of these similes. In the second part of the paper Plotinus’ discussions of the two similes are used to shed light on Sentence 16, in particular on the term προχείρισις . Furthermore
, however, finish off the trilogy with a dialogue called the Theaetetus , the bulk of which is a conversation that occurred the day before the Sophist and Statesman , but which Socrates recorded via Euclides afterwards as he sat in prison. 4 Socrates thus wrote the Theaetetus with Athens’ judgment
complications that the reading explains and motivates: some co-occur with sensation and are immediate but still coarse-grained, while others are mediated just like the emotions.
Best to start with a catalog from the Theaetetus that conflates affect and sensation. 12 That marked difference with the
of the Theaetetus . See Plato: Theaetetus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). Myles Burnyeat irts with the idea in his The Theaetetus on how we Think DAVID BARTON A BSTRACT I argue that PlatoÕs purpose in the discussion of false belief in the Theaetetus is to entertain and then to reject the idea that