two kinds of concepts pertaining to the same kind of things. But only one of the two is completely determined by exter- nal relations. Thus I conclude that the externalist picture of Ockham calls for some additions. Keywords externalism, concepts, acquisitionofconcepts, subordination, conventional
At the beginning of Posterior Analytics 2.19 Aristotle reminds us that we cannot claim demonstrative knowledge (epistêmê apodeiktikê) unless we know immediate premisses, the archai of demonstrations. By the end of the chapter he explains why the cognitive state whereby we get to know archai must be Nous. In between, however, Aristotle describes the process of the acquisition of concepts, not immediate premisses. How should we understand this? There is a general agreement that it is Nous by means of which we acquire both premisses and concepts. I argue that this cannot be the case. Since concepts are simples while premisses are composites (predications of concepts), the two cannot be objects of the same cognitive state. I further argue that, whereas Nous is responsible for our grasp of concepts, the state Aristotle elsewhere calls non-demonstrable knowledge is the one whereby we get to know the premisses of demonstrations.
statistical properties of the environment or through more explicit acquisitionofconcepts, can influence synaesthetic experiences. Of course, future work also needs to address the more fundamental questions of how synaesthetic experiences arise in the brain and why some people have synaesthesia but most do
-linguistic. 13 Due to
the close ties between non-discursive formationism and non-discursive founda-
tionalism, if the former thesis is incorrect so is also the latter. But I shall not
expand on this point here.
4. The Theoretical Status of Mental Concepts
The acquisitionofconcepts requires, then, a prior
possible. Whether exploring racism (Hirschfeld 1996), stories and rhymes (Rubin 1995), religion (Atran 2002; Boyer 2001; Guthrie 1993), practical knowledge about plants and animals (Atran 1990), or ghosts (Bering 2002), describing how non-cultural features of human minds encourage the acquisitionof
the suggested abstraction ›model‹.
In an attempt to make my task more manageable, I start by examining
acquisitionofconcepts that pick out entities with obvious visible similarities,
e.g. tree and dog. Continuing, I examine how we learn concepts like fuel,
danger or food, whose instances vary
be nous . In between, however, Aristotle describes the process of the acquisitionofconcepts, not immediate premisses. How should we under- stand this? There is a general agreement that it is nous by means of which we acquire both premisses and concepts. I argue that this cannot be the case. Since
that it simply enables Aquinas to explain how the acquisitionofconcepts and cognition work. However, it does not help him to give an account of knowledge. In order to explain knowledge in the strict Aristotelian sense, it would have been necessary for Aquinas to spell out how a cognitive process
people get from one to the other.
3. Language and the acquisitionofconcepts
How does a person progress from a (nonconceptual) rudimentary fi rst-
person perspective to the full self-consciousness of a (conceptual) robust
fi rst-person perspective? A baby is born with the biological equipment
The most obvious of these limits is a strong focus on verbal language.
Francophone educational semiotics fails to think about and promote the “semiotic
richness” of educational settings. Because the main point is the acquisitionofconcepts, every classroom activity must find its conclusion