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Author: Penelope Maddy

argument. Practiced professionals may easily feel the force of these blunt formulations, but the skeptical worries most likely to engage and trouble our philosophically-innocent but inquiring mind seem to me to be the original sources: the Dream Argument and the Argument from Illusion. As to meta

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Barry Stroud

compelling arguments for that conclusion: “The Dream Argument” and “The Argument from Illusion.” She does not explain at the beginning what makes those “arguments” so compelling. But it soon becomes clear that Maddy herself does not find them compelling at all. She doesn’t think they go any distance towards

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: John McDowell

It is a plain fact that the backs of solid objects are not in view. This has no skeptical significance, for reasons Austin explains. Skeptical implications could attach only to a corresponding non-plain fact. This brings out a distinctive interest in Clarke’s surface inquiry.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: H.J. Blumenthal

. BLUMENTHAL 1) For a recent discussion of the arguments, cf. A. Kenny, The Argument from Illusion in Aristotle's Metaphysics ( Γ , 1009-10), Mind 76 (1967), 184-97, esp. 190 ff. 2) Cf. e.g. de Anima 418 a 11-13. 3) Aristotelis Metaphysica, II (Bonn 1849), 205 f.; cf. also C. Kirwan, Aristotle's Metaphysics Γ

In: Mnemosyne
Author: Penelope Maddy

why they do it. As the Plain Inquirer finds the Dream Argument and the Argument from Illusion less than conclusive, she wants to understand what makes them so psychologically compelling nevertheless and even to explore the therapeutic possibilities for releasing their hold on us. I’m not at all

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

For reasons of space, I could not comment on the rich discussion of the argument from illusion in Chapter 2 of What Do Philosophers Do?

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

perceptual errors are possible. In other words, just as we need to presuppose the existence of an ‘external world’ that is broadly like our own in order to get the RE scenario off the ground, so perception must generally be taken to be reliable if an ‘argument from illusion’ is to be constructed. So, what

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Alan Thomas

aspect of this paper is its isolation of a certain kind of sceptical strategy. The misnamed “argument from illusion” proceeds as follows: compare a veridical perceptual experience “from the perspective of the subject” with its non-veridical counterpart and isolate the “highest common factor” that those

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Arata Hamawaki

highest common factor way of thinking about our sensory experience would not be based on argument, certainly not on the rightly derided argument from illusion, but simply on the particular way that the philosopher seeks to pose the question he does about our knowledge. I think that it follows from this

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

. A question unanswerable in this way is not a genuine question. One thing that Clarke’s Concept Design makes clear is the reason why the Argument from Illusion matters to skepticism about the external world. We can think of the Argument as collecting concepts which fail to be “marks

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism