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Authors: Philip Atkins and Ian Nance

bizarre experiment. 6 As indicated in note 2 above, DeRose claims that there are convincing versions of the second premise of his Argument from Ignorance that do not depend on the closure principle. Some other reasoning must be behind such arguments. 7 As we emphasize in Section 5, below

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

ordinary beliefs are in jeopardy. ‘Closure’-based sceptical arguments tend to run as follows: ( biv 1) If I know I have two hands, then I know I’m not a brain-in-a-vat ( biv ). 1 (( biv 1) is motivated by the closure principle, “If S knows that p, and S competently deduces q from p thereby coming to

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

is not try to answer the sceptical problem ‘directly’, but rather to undermine the assumptions that it depends on. These are among the most ingrained assumptions in contemporary epistemology. They include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the ‘closureprinciple for knowledge

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

The paper presents the key themes of my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the justification of basic laws of inference.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Peter Murphy

’s arsenal that make appeal to skeptical scenarios, one of which employs a closure principle and the other an underdetermination principle. My aim is to answer this question: how cogent are these arguments when the ignorance account is used to generate the skeptical scenarios that are appealed to in them? I

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Peter Murphy

In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios (those that can power a prima facie compelling skeptical argument) all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem for skeptical arguments: they require the KK principle. We respond to this criticism on behalf of the skeptic in our paper.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

motivated by appeal to the following principle: The Closure Principle If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p , and S competently deduces from p that q , thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p , then S has rationally

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Antonia Barke
This book investigates whether knowledge is closed under known entailment. Traditionally it has been assumed that if a person knows some proposition p and also knows that this proposition entails another proposition q, then by inferring q from p that person would gain knowledge of q. This so-called ‚Principle of Deductive Closure‘ is of intrinsic interest because, if true, it expresses an important structural characteristic of knowledge. Challenges to this principle of deductive closure have been formulated by Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, among others. Most replies to these challenges, as well as the challenges themselves, make explicit or implicit use of the idea that our knowledge claims are not invariant, but relative to a context. Therefore, a substantial part of the book is devoted to an analysis of contextualism and a criticism of the current contextualistic accounts. Once developed, the account is then used to answer the challenge to the principle of deductive closure. Epistemic contextualism results in a limited closure principle.
Author: Keith DeRose

solution is a case for a certain understanding of the closure principle for knowledge on which “Oxford Closure”—a form of the principle which does not contain a fix for the problem of the aggregation of risk—is denied. In Chapter Six, Insensitivity accounts, on which various puzzling appearances of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism