there is a problem of what Coliva calls cognitivelocality, the Moderate position could adequately address it. I consider this in Section 3.
It is crucial to the Moderate position that the tacit presupposition of certain background assumptions is constitutive of empirical rationality. The second issue
overcome our “cognitivelocality” and bring our perceptual experiences “to bear on a universe populated by physical objects” ( Coliva 2015 : 4). I think Coliva does a very good job in showing, contra the liberal view, that if we did not accept such heavy-weight propositions our perceptual experiences
possible only on basis of a prior “system of assumptions” (2015: 3). The assumptions are needed in order to overcome “our cognitivelocality,” they enable us to go beyond our personal or subjective phenomenal experiences and to connect such experiences to a “universe populated by physical objects” (2015: 4
facing papier-mâché hands, for instance. What we need those assumptions for is to be able to overcome what one might call ‘our cognitivelocality.’ Namely, we need them in order justifiably to go beyond our experiences and to bring them to bear on a universe populated by physical objects, whose precise
like P, as Millar readily admits.
Let us now turn to Millar’s main issue, namely whether my brand of Moderatism solves the problem of cognitivelocality. Let me state clearly what I would regard as a solution to the problem. Not merely an assumption of P’s truth (which is part and parcel of
“cognitivelocality.” 9 In this case, by allowing us to take mind-dependent evidence to bear onto beliefs about mind-independent objects.
It is worth pointing out that, on such a view, certain epistemic principles would fail. For instance, there wouldn’t be transmission of justification from a set of