Search Results

Author: Alan Millar

there is a problem of what Coliva calls cognitive locality, the Moderate position could adequately address it. I consider this in Section 3. It is crucial to the Moderate position that the tacit presupposition of certain background assumptions is constitutive of empirical rationality. The second issue

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Giorgio Volpe

overcome our “cognitive locality” and bring our perceptual experiences “to bear on a universe populated by physical objects” ( Coliva 2015 : 4). I think Coliva does a very good job in showing, contra the liberal view, that if we did not accept such heavy-weight propositions our perceptual experiences

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

possible only on basis of a prior “system of assumptions” (2015: 3). The assumptions are needed in order to overcome “our cognitive locality,” they enable us to go beyond our personal or subjective phenomenal experiences and to connect such experiences to a “universe populated by physical objects” (2015: 4

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

facing papier-mâché hands, for instance. What we need those assumptions for is to be able to overcome what one might call ‘our cognitive locality.’ Namely, we need them in order justifiably to go beyond our experiences and to bring them to bear on a universe populated by physical objects, whose precise

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

like P, as Millar readily admits. Let us now turn to Millar’s main issue, namely whether my brand of Moderatism solves the problem of cognitive locality. Let me state clearly what I would regard as a solution to the problem. Not merely an assumption of P’s truth (which is part and parcel of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

cognitive locality.” 9 In this case, by allowing us to take mind-dependent evidence to bear onto beliefs about mind-independent objects. It is worth pointing out that, on such a view, certain epistemic principles would fail. For instance, there wouldn’t be transmission of justification from a set of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism