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between Common Sense Epistemology and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Indeed, the study of this philosophical disagreement teaches us important things about common sense. Moreover, it appears that common sense epistemology is quite optimistic about its capacity to rationally resolve the controversy

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

thereof, should be measured. This paper discusses two notions that have been proposed as touchstones for philosophy: naive experience and common sense . These notions are, intuitively, related, since both have such connotations as “nonspecialized,” “pretheoretical,” “plain,” “obvious,” and “widely

In: Philosophia Reformata
Author: Bradford McCall

Journal of Pentecostal Th eology 19 (2010) 59–75 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/174552510X490764 Th e Pentecostal Reappropriation of Common Sense Realism Bradford McCall * 1000 Regent University Dr., Virginia Beach, VA 23464, USA Abstract Th e

In: Journal of Pentecostal Theology
Author: Thomas Kazen

studies. 1 Sanders’s picture of Second Temple purity practices is one of general custom, shared by the majority, with a heightened degree of concern among certain groups, yet modified by a good portion of common sense. Some of the details in this picture will be spelled out below. In this article I

In: Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus
This collection of 17 articles offers an overview of the philosophical activities of a group of philosophers (who have been) working at the Groningen University. The meta-methodological assumption which unifies the research of this group, holds that there is a way to do philosophy which is a middle course between abstract normative philosophy of science and descriptive social studies of science. On the one hand it is argued with social studies of science that philosophy should take notice of what scientists actually do. On the other hand, however, it is claimed that philosophy can and should aim to reveal cognitive patterns in the processes and products of scientific and common sense knowledge. Since it is thought that those patterns can function as guidelines in new research and/or in research in other disciplines, philosophy can nevertheless hold on to the normative aim which is characteristic of 'classical' philosophy of science. Compared to this common assumption, there is a diversity of subjects. Some papers deal with general problems of science, knowledge, cognition and argumentation, others with topics relating to foundational problems of particular sciences. Therefore this volume is of interest to philosophers of science, to philosophers of knowledge and argumentation in general, to philosophers of mind, as well as for scientists working in the physical and applied sciences, biology, psychology and economy who are interested in the foundations of their disciplines. After a foreword by Leszek Nowak and a general introduction by the editors, the book is divided into four parts, with special introductions. - I: Conceptual Analysis in Service of Various Research Programmes (Henk Zandvoort, Rein Vos, Rick Looijen, Gerben Stavenga, Renée Dalitz); - II: The Logic of the Evaluation of Arguments, Hypotheses, Default Rules, and Interesting Theorems (Erik Krabbe, Theo Kuipers, Alfons Keupink, Maarten Janssen/Yao-Hua Tan, Bert Hamminga); - III: Three Challenges to the Truth Approximation Programme (Sjoerd Zwart, Hinne Hettema/Theo Kuipers, Roberto Festa); - IV: Explicating Psychological Intuitions (Anne-Ruth Mackor, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Lex Guichard, Michel ter Hark). The Groningen research group was recently qualified, by an official international assessment committee, as one of the best philosophy research groups in the Netherlands.
Authors: Marcus Green and Peter Ives

Historical Materialism Research in Critical Marxist Th eory Volume 17 Issue 1 2009 CONTENTS Article s Marcus E. Green and Peter Ives Subalternity and Language: Overcoming the Fragmentation of Common Sense ......................................................................... 3 Henry Heller

In: Historical Materialism
In everyday life, we explain and predict human actions through beliefs and intentions. We also assume the existence of persons who act on the basis of reasons. Naturalist philosophers do not accept this concept of 'agent causality': what common sense and sociological explanations called reasons should be interpreted as normal causes of actions. As a matter of fact social sciences increasingly use the causal model of the natural sciences in order to explain human actions. In this volume leading specialists in action theory discuss the question: Is the causal model of the natural sciences sufficient to explain human actions or can we expect an explanatory advantage from the classical concept of agent causality? Contributors: R. Boudon, F. Castellani, A. Corradini, M. De Caro, S. Galvan, G. Keil, E. J. Lowe, U. Meixner, A. Mele, T. O'Connor, J. Quitterer, E. Runggaldier, A. Varzi, H. Weidemann