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Robin Churchill

here on a negative aspect: the problem of persisting and widespread non-compliance with the Convention. I begin by giving some examples of such non-compliance and explaining why I consider it to be a problem that merits serious attention. I then suggest some ways in which the current situation could be

Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida

under its constituent instruments, and also to uphold its legitimacy towards the contracting Parties and its ‘constituencies’, then the Court may be considered effective. 12 The hypothesis of this article is that judgment compliance 13 does not compromise the effectiveness of international

Risk and Compliance with Normative Frameworks Relating to Disaster Management

Exploratory Case Studies from Indonesia and Ireland

Ronan McDermott and Patrick Gibbons

perceive risk and how “different tools and techniques are assembled into practices of organisational governance.” 17 The article thus explores the extent to which the perception of disaster risk on the part of disaster management authorities influences compliance with normative frameworks relating to

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Cecily Rose

. But the conclusion of these treaties has not, for the most part, been accompanied by efforts to monitor compliance with them after their entry into force. Most transnational criminal law treaties do not benefit from any sort of monitoring mechanism that would allow states parties or other actors to

Cecily Rose

internationally. But the conclusion of these treaties has not, for the most part, been accompanied by efforts to monitor compliance with them after their entry into force. Most transnational criminal law treaties do not benefit from any sort of monitoring mechanism that would allow states parties or other actors

Marco Bocchese

bracketed and then cast aside politically salient questions, including what motives underlie ratification and how said motives affect state prospects of compliance with treaty obligations. 2 For them, ratification is the starting point. Legal obligations arise from the sovereign—and self-binding—act of

Sebastian Oberthür and Eliza Northrop

1 Introduction Article 15 of the Paris Agreement establishes a “mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions” of the Agreement. It provides that the mechanism “shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and

Peter G.G. Davies

1. Introduction Early environmental treaty regimes placed little emphasis on the development of systems designed to assess compliance by State Parties with their international commitments or to facilitate such compliance. More recently, however, the introduction of procedures to ensure

Marco Fey, Aviv Melamud and Harald Müller

economics (Fehr & Schmidt 1999 ). 4 But it has hardly been identified in international relations ( ir ) research as one of the parameters of regime membership behavior and regime stability. As compliance with regime rules is a central aspect of governance “effectiveness,” this article explores the

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Brita Bohman

1 Introduction Managerial compliance is a concept that was introduced in international law in the 1990s as an alternative view on how and why states comply with international agreements. 1 The basic idea in this view on compliance is that states want to comply with international agreements, and