Let’s now look more closely at the structure of some of these examples.
The drunken slurring example is a case of epistemicasymmetry . So is the hypothesis that my spouse left the country this morning, purposely without telling me. Another example is my knowledge that my
am. If I were in the bad case, I wouldn’t (or mightn’t) know which case I was in. There is a deep epistemicasymmetry between the cases, which the Cartesian Picture ignores or occludes.
Schönbaumsfeld’s argument to this point is an exercise in what I call ‘theoretical’ diagnosis. Philosophers who take
occurs in cases that illustrate what has been referred to as epistemicasymmetry (Sweetser, 1990). Consider sentence (12): (12) María tomó la clase y interpretó correctamente los poemas . ‘Mary took the class and interpreted the poems correctly.’ Sentence (12) is also ambiguous. The sentence
Journal for the Study of Skepticism
8 ( 3 ): 208 – 222 .
Leite , Adam
. 2019 . “ Skepticism and EpistemicAsymmetry ,”
29 : 184 – 197 .
Again, the point noted parenthetically at the end of the previous paragraph should be kept in mind
Drunken Speech case doesn’t incline me to think I could refute extraordinary dreaming in the same way as I refute ordinary dreaming.
But these examples are just intended as intuition pumps for Leite’s principled objections, so let me turn to those …
The first centers on so-called “epistemicasymmetry
notion of the Earth implies a fundamental asymmetry between the (undifferentiated) materiality of Earth and the (differentiated) material entities of the Earth. This asymmetry is not only an epistemicasymmetry as limitation of what is known—the Earth as terra incognita —but also an ontological
case, there would be an epistemicasymmetry between truth and falsehood, because falsehood would not be used as a notion implying an assimilative process, as Aquinas obviously uses ‘truth’. 69 This reading could certainly be squared with Aquinas’ description of the first operation of the intellect, i
- siderations into two classes—(a) those which are rightly associated with the sort of epistemicasymmetry illustrated by the case of pain/retribution and (b) those which are not. Call those considerations which fall into class (a) asymmetric reasons; call candidate reason-giving considerations which fall into
widespread peer disagreement is false. Epistemic peerhood requires strict evidential and cognitive equality. Any difference in evidence or cognition could constitute a relevant epistemicasymmetry in a dispute that justifies downgrading one’s opponent. So there is widespread disagreement in philosophy, but
belief? Why would there be this epistemicasymmetry in defeat and justification?
Finally, we get to the less-justified strategy . According to this view, your deceived counterpart is not completely un justified in believing as she does. It’s just that you have better justification than she does