Circularity: Vicious, Virtuous and Benign John Greco Saint Louis University email@example.com Abstract Sosa’s work on epistemiccircularity has signiﬁ cance beyond his own brand of virtue epistemology, with its characteristic distinction between animal and reﬂ ective knowledge. On the contrary, it demonstrates
Plain Inquirer astray!
EpistemicCircularity, the Reliability of Sense Perception, and What We Can Demand From Evidence
Now, you might think that evidence should do a certain kind of work for us. Evidence about whether p, it might be thought, should be the sort of thing that could help you
the anti-skeptic may employ these arguments in lieu of simply falling silent when a non-inferentially justified belief is challenged. The almost universal assumption among philosophers that epistemicallycircular arguments are rationally useless is mistaken, and this fact can be utilized by the clever
According to Roderick Chisholm, there are three ways of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul, Paul Moser, and Earl Conee have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problem that rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm describes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg the question or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity.
’s Refutation of Relativism ......................................... 79 Book Symposium Anthony Brueckner A Defense of Burge’s “Self-Verifying Judgments” ........................ 27 Finn Spicer Two Ways to Be Right about What One Is Th inking .................. 33 John Greco EpistemicCircularity: Vicious
epistemic presuppositions. Since this chapter is not as important for Shogenji’s major problem as the other chapters, it is passed over. In Chapter 3 (“The Myth of EpistemicCircularity”), Shogenji presents his solution to the problem of epistemiccircularity. His major example is the psychological argument
fundamental epistemic principle, then any epistemic argument for F—including one involving R—will be epistemicallycircular. And that of course is the rub. For an epistemicallycircular argument for a conclusion you don’t accept should not, in general, be recognized as an epistemic reason for that conclusion
surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa’s. I suggest that the diﬀ erences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge. Keywords animal knowledge ; Descartes ; epistemiccircularity ; epistemic responsibility ; Pyrrhonian Problematic ; reﬂ
to play. For example, the thesis that epistemicallycircular arguments are not vicious but justification-conferring takes perceptual experience to play R EC . 5 R M is the role that the so-called Moorean liberals take perceptual experience to play, while R LC is the role that those liberals (like
Chapter 5 focuses on epistemiccircularity. Let’s assume that frameworks have a structure and are built around basic principles, like a principle that says that beliefs formed through observation (e.g. looking through a telescope) in certain conditions are justified. It looks like the only kind of