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1 Introduction In this paper, we consider two Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox that arises from the principle of epistemic closure under known entailment. We assume that perceptual evidence is propositional   1 and we formulate an instance of the paradox as follows

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Giorgio Volpe

‘liberal’ accounts. Extended Rationality is full of insightful ideas not only on the structure of epistemic warrant, but on related subjects such as epistemic closure, transmission of warrant and easy knowledge, and these ideas are woven together in a comprehensive account of the nature of epistemic

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: XU Zhaoqing

As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a “dogmatism paradox” which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant alternatives.

In: Frontiers of Philosophy in China
In Hinge Epistemology, eminent epistemologists investigate Wittgenstein's concept of basic certainty or 'hinge certainty'. The volume begins by examining the salient features of 'hinges': Are they propositions that enjoy a special kind of non-evidential justification? Are they objects of knowledge or ways of acting mistaken for known propositions? Various attempts are then made to integrate hinges in the development of a viable epistemology: Can they shed light on the conditions of satisfaction for knowledge and justification? Do they offer a solution to scepticism? Finally, the application of hinges is explored in such areas as common knowledge and intellectual loyalty. The volume attests to the importance of hinge certainty and Wittgenstein's On Certainty for mainstream epistemology.

an analytical category; rather, it is to highlight the theoretical or epistemic closure that the over-reliance on conversion as the only way of reading Black African Muslim presence in South African Islam performs. 22 Diagne, “Toward an intellectual History of West Africa,” p. 21. 23

In: Islamic Africa
Author: Tim Kraft

What is the role of sceptical scenarios—dreams, evil demons, brains in a vat—in sceptical arguments? According to the error view, sceptical scenarios illustrate the possibility of massive falsity in one’s beliefs, whereas according to the ignorance view, they illustrate the possibility of massive ignorance not necessarily due to falsity. In this paper, the ignorance view is defended by surveying the arguments in favour of it and by replying to two pressing objections against it. According to the first objection, the ignorance view illicitly introduces the kk-principle into sceptical arguments. In reply I argue that kk is not less plausible than its main rival, the closure principle. According to the second objection, relying on veridical ignorance-possibilities contradicts the transparency of belief. In reply I introduce a version of transparency that is consistent with the ignorance view.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Krista Lawlor

Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic principles are too weak to generate the skeptical paradox. I briefly consider how the contextualist might live without (strong) closure.

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien

Volume 7, No. 1 Articles Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts  1 Luca Moretti and Tomoji Shogenji P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism  26 Joe Campbell Discussion In Defense of Piecemeal Skepticism  53

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
A Companion to Contemporary Western Philosophy
Editor: Tiziana Andina
This volume, edited by Tiziana Andina, tackles some of the most compelling questions addressed in contemporary philosophy. Covering areas so diverse as metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, political philosophy, philosophy of art, epistemology and philosophy of mind, this book maps the past fifty years of philosophical reflection, Bridging the Analytical Continental Divide. Not only will the reader get to know philosophy’s most interesting and promising developments, but she will also be immersed in human thought in a broader sense, as the book explores both our ability to explore the world and ask questions and our capability to organize societies, create art and give humankind an ethical and a political dimension.

Contributors include: Tiziana Andina, Annalisa Amoretti, Luca Angelone, Alessandro Arbo, Carola Barbero, Andrea Borghini, Francesco Berto, Chiara Cappelletto, Stefano Caputo, Elena Casetta, Annalisa Coliva, Francesca De Vecchi, Maurizio Ferraris, Valeria Ottonelli, Andrea Pedeferri, Daniela Tagliafico, Italo Testa, Giuliano Torrengo, Vera Tripodi.
Author: Moti Mizrahi

). “ Strong, therefore Sensitive: Misgivings about DeRose’s Contextualism ,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 : 237 – 253 . De Almeida C. ( 2012 ). “ Epistemic Closure, Skepticism, and Defeasibility ,” Synthese 188 : 197 – 215 . DeRose K. ( 2004 ). “ Sosa, Safety, and Skeptical Hypotheses

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism