Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 31 items for :

  • All: "epistemological disjunctivism" x
Clear All
Author: Thomas Lockhart

1 Introduction According to epistemological disjunctivism I can justifiably lay claim to know facts about the world around me on the basis of my perceptual experience. So suppose I look out of the window next to my desk and see a Japanese maple tree in my garden, and this perceptual

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Heather Logue

deals with the access problem by arguing that epistemological disjunctivism doesn’t entail that one can know that there is a banana before one by reflection alone —reflective knowledge that one sees that p always comes with empirical knowledge that p afforded by seeing (Part One, §7). Pritchard

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Tommaso Piazza

1 Introduction Epistemological Disjunctivism ( ed ) is the view, championed by Duncan Pritchard (2012) , that when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that P, one’s epistemic support for believing P is constituted by S’s factive state of seeing that P. It is an alleged virtue of ed

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

philosophically satisfying response to the dual problem posed by radical scepticism is a dual response which is compatible, integrated, and entered in the same spirit. I think epistemological disjunctivism —a view that is rooted in the work of John McDowell (e.g., 1995 )—fits the bill in this regard. Very

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Kegan J. Shaw

1 Disjunctivism and the ‘New Evil Genius’ 1.1 Epistemological disjunctivism ( ed ) conceives of perceptual knowledge as essentially grounded in evidential support that is both factive and reflectively accessible. In at least paragon cases, when it ‘looks’ to you as if p because you

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
In: Grazer Philosophische Studien

one excludes believing the other. 1.3 Misconceptions about Epistemological Disjunctivism Ranalli thinks that epistemological disjunctivism is the view that in the good case you are in a perceptual state that furnishes you with true beliefs. This isn’t quite right, however, because

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Editor: Johannes Brandl
Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition. Each year at least two volumes are published, including special issues with invited papers. Reviews are accepted by invitation only.

Volume 8, No. 1 Articles Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis 1 Thomas Lockhart Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism? 31 Jonathan Hill Critical Notice Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst 51 John Greco Book Reviews Pierre Bayle, Dialogues

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Prediction Objection  193 Esben Petersen Underdetermination Skepticism and Skeptical Dogmatism  218 Mark Walker Discussion Against Piecemeal Skepticism  253 Eric Yang Book Reviews Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism  257

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism