It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (ed) that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ed—which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this paper is to show that Zalabardo’s criticism of this solution fails. To begin with, I show that it is based on excessively demanding epistemic principles. Moreover, I argue that on a more plausible epistemic principle Zalabardo’s conclusion doesn’t go through.
—it is a must-read for anyone with interests in the epistemologyofperception.
Byrne A. ( 2012 ). “ Knowing what I see .” In Smithies D. and Stoljar D. (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness , 183 – 210 . Oxford : Oxford University Press .
Evans G. ( 1982 ). The
( 2011 ). “ How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief ,”
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( 2014 ). “ Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge ,”
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Christoph U EHLINGER , Interested Companionship .............................. 359 Book Reviews Stephen H. Phillips and N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, EpistemologyofPerception: Gan ˙ ge ˜ a’s Tattvacint ® man . i Jewel of Reflection on the Truth (About Epistemology) (Bogdan D IACONESCU ) ................ 112
). “ Cognitive Penetration and the EpistemologyofPerception ,” in
. ( 2015 ). “ On Direct Social Perception ,” in
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. ( 2015 ). “ Epistemic Versus All
authors focus on responding to objections against the very possibility of moral perception. Second, even where positive accounts are given, many fail to engage the recent literature in the epistemologyofperception and how moral perception may fit (or not fit) with recent accounts of the contents of
abstraction, for valuation, together with some freedom (or spontaneity, depending on how you define your variables). Fourth, it stands for pure experience, in the sense that everything that ‘is’ either experiences or is experienced – full stop.’
Michael Weber, ‘Whitehead’s Onto-EpistemologyofPerception
| has been expected but not imaged takes | for the minutes it occupies now.” The lack of image, of a pre-formed conception, makes the visitation possible and enables a re-formation of the knowledge of the world at the moment of perception. The world in its ontological status and the epistemologyof