1 Introduction This essay is in no way a critical notice or summary of Bart Streumer’s fine book, which is full of valuable insights.
My aim is simply to explain how, in my view, naturalists can and should resist his case for an errortheory in ethics. As it happens, I agree with a great
Jonas Olson writes that “a plausible moral errortheory must be an errortheory about all irreducible normativity.” 1 I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this errortheory. I will argue that Olson cannot believe it either.
I will first argue that Olson should say that reasons
Jonas Olson defends a moral errortheory in 2014 . I will first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the errortheory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I will then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the errortheory as opposed to moral
I am very grateful to Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen for forcing me to rethink much of what I said in Moral ErrorTheory: History, Critique, and Defence (henceforth met ). In this response I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim
any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral errortheory is often considered the most notorious of
1 Introduction Frank Jackson, Philip Stratton-Lake, and Mark Schroeder are not convinced by my arguments for the errortheory. Neither am I.
But I will argue that their objections to my arguments fail. I think my arguments for the errortheory are unconvincing merely because we cannot
: 89–90). Another piece of evidence may be charity, which may seem to require that we do not interpret all normative judgments as false and that we therefore prefer non-cognitivism to the errortheory. But I argue in the book that charity in fact does not require this (2017: 89). And I do not think
1 Introduction In Unbelievable Errors , I defend an errortheory about all normative judgments: not only moral judgments, but also judgments about reasons for action, judgments about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgments. This theory says that these judgments are beliefs that
1 Introduction In Unbelievable Errors , I defend an errortheory about all normative judgements: not only moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs
McDowell’s claims about the errors of sceptical argument and what we ought to say about a comparable position, namely, errortheory in meta-ethics.
2 Scepticism: From Dissolution to Engagement
It seems to me clear that, to use a favourite McDowellian word, there is something of an “oscillation