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Author: Frank Jackson

1 Introduction This essay is in no way a critical notice or summary of Bart Streumer’s fine book, which is full of valuable insights. 1 My aim is simply to explain how, in my view, naturalists can and should resist his case for an error theory in ethics. As it happens, I agree with a great

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Bart Streumer

Jonas Olson writes that “a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity.” 1 I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. I will argue that Olson cannot believe it either. I will first argue that Olson should say that reasons

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Daan Evers

Introduction Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014 . I will first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I will then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Jonas Olson

I am very grateful to Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen for forcing me to rethink much of what I said in Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, and Defence (henceforth met ). In this response I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Jonas Olson

any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Bart Streumer

1 Introduction Frank Jackson, Philip Stratton-Lake, and Mark Schroeder are not convinced by my arguments for the error theory. Neither am I. 1 But I will argue that their objections to my arguments fail. I think my arguments for the error theory are unconvincing merely because we cannot

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Bart Streumer

: 89–90). Another piece of evidence may be charity, which may seem to require that we do not interpret all normative judgments as false and that we therefore prefer non-cognitivism to the error theory. But I argue in the book that charity in fact does not require this (2017: 89). And I do not think

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Bart Streumer

1 Introduction In Unbelievable Errors , I defend an error theory about all normative judgments: not only moral judgments, but also judgments about reasons for action, judgments about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgments. This theory says that these judgments are beliefs that

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Bart Streumer

1 Introduction In Unbelievable Errors , I defend an error theory about all normative judgements: not only moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Alan Thomas

McDowell’s claims about the errors of sceptical argument and what we ought to say about a comparable position, namely, error theory in meta-ethics. 2 Scepticism: From Dissolution to Engagement It seems to me clear that, to use a favourite McDowellian word, there is something of an “oscillation

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism