Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 68 items for :

  • All: "evidentialism" x
  • Search level: All x
Clear All
Author: Robert Hudson

1 Introduction The overall goal of this paper is to defend Nishi Shah’s evidentialism from recent pragmatist critiques. ‘Evidentialism’, as Shah ( 2006 ) defines it, is the view that only evidence for a proposition’s truth constitutes a reason to believe this proposition. In opposition to

In: Contemporary Pragmatism
Author: Tommaso Piazza

1 Introduction Evidentialism about epistemic justification is the view, or family of views, according to which whether a belief that P is justified for a subject S at a time t just depends on the evidence that S possesses at t . Although a few epistemologists have contended that

In: Non-Evidentialist Epistemology

irrationality” ( Parfit 1984 , 12 f; 2001, 27). In an outlook, I will finally point out implications of my argument for the debate between evidentialism and pragmatism in the ethics of belief (Section 4). 2 Why it is Better for You to be Irrational Someone who disagrees with me has to argue that

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien

be non-evidential in nature. I discuss two fundamental—and, in my view, related—challenges to non-evidentialist anti-scepticism. Advocates of non-evidentialism must answer the question: given the absence of evidence, what is epistemically good about accepting cornerstone propositions? This challenge

In: Non-Evidentialist Epistemology
Author: John J. Johnson

This paper compares J. W. Montgomery’s evidentialist approach to apologetics to Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositional approach. My position is that Van Til’s system is only theistic; it may support the existence of ‘God,’ but it does not prove the existence of the Christian God. In fact, Van Til’s method could just as easily be used by a Muslim apologist to assert the validity of Islam. This is because Van Til refuses to allow objective evidence to have any place in Christian apologetics. Because of this, he offers the non-theist no way of judging between the truth claims of Christianity and other religions. In fact, the most powerful weapon in the Christian apologist’s arsenal, the resurrection of Christ, cannot be used in an effective manner. This is in direct contradiction to the New Testament itself, where the resurrection is often used evidentially to validate the Christian faith.

In: Evangelical Quarterly: An International Review of Bible and Theology
Author: Samuel Kahn

In this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have endorsed this principle.

In: Contemporary Pragmatism
This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.
Author: Kevin McCain

1 Introduction Evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification is solely a matter of the evidence one has, is exceedingly plausible. 1 In fact, its leading contemporary defenders, Earl Conee and Rich Feldman, cite their amazement that views inconsistent with Evidentialism were being

In: Non-Evidentialist Epistemology
Author: Jonathan Adler

James’ The Will to Believe is the most influential writing in the ethics of belief. In it, James defends the right and rationality to believe on non-evidential grounds. James’ argument is directed against Clifford’s “Evidentialism” presented in The Ethics of Belief in which Clifford concludes that “[i]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”. After an overview of the James-Clifford exchange and James’ argument, I reconstruct his argument in detail. Subsequently, I examine four steps in James’ argument, and try to show that these amount to fallacies – enticing to reason, but not cogent.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Tommaso Piazza

In the first part of this paper I suggest that Dogmatism about perceptual justification – the view that in the most basic cases, perceptual justification is immediate – commits to rejecting Evidentialism, as it commits, specifically, to accounting for the mechanics of perceptual justification otherwise than by maintaining that perceptual experiences justify by providing evidence. In the second part of the paper, by following W. Hopp’s recent interpretation of Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation, I suggest that Husserl’s theory of fulfilment provides the basis of the non-evidential account of the mechanics of perceptual justification needed to vindicate Dogmatism.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis