The shift in emphasis from being to the concept of being, from real being to possible being, that we observe in the history of metaphysics, and which led to the rise of ontology, brings us face-to-face with a key question: What is the place of existence in being, and in the conception of being that
Series:
Piotr Jaroszyński
Translator Hugh McDonald
Series:
Piotr Jaroszyński and Hugh McDonald
The shift in emphasis from being to the concept of being, from real being to possible being, that we observe in the history of metaphysics, and which led to the rise of ontology, brings us face-to-face with a key question: What is the place of existence in being, and in the conception of being that
Fedor Benevich
At the beginning of the 11th century CE , the philosopher Abū ʿAlī b. Sīnā, known in the western tradition under the name of Avicenna (d. 1037), introduced the idea of essences (sing. ḏāt , ḥaqīqa , māhiyya and sometimes ṭabīʿa ) that do not have existence ( wuǧūd ) due to themselves, but
† Yegane Shayegan
Edited by Bahman Zakipour and Samaneh Gachpazian
“Essence” versus “Existence” in Avicenna Averroes’ basic error was his complete misunderstanding of the distinction between the verb “to be (Grk. einai )” and the substantive “being (Grk. to on ).” “To be” for him was the “existent,” which is not distinguished from “essence” or “quiddity
Deuser, Hermann and Willaschek, Marcus
[German Version] I. Philosophy – II. Philosophy of Religion and Dogmatics The philosophical expression, “existence” (Lat. “existential”), first coined in Late Antiquity by Marius Victorinus as a translation of the Greek, ὕπαρξις (hýparxis, “pre-beginning”), has, since the Middle Ages, referred to
Asep N. Musadad
important place in his thought. His views are also linked to the notion of the principality of existence ( aṣālat wuğūd ), on which all Sadrian discussions are based. This paper explores the key themes of his argument in which he defines the Qurʾān as a mode of existence and the implications of his views
Kierkegaard, Religion, and Existence
The Voyage of the Self
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Avi Sagi
Tom Stoneham
Quine’s justly famous paper “On What There Is” introduced a criterion of ontological commitment which has been almost universally accepted by analytic philosophers ever since. In this paper I try to unpack some of the substantive and controversial philosophical commitments that are presupposed by this criterion. The aim is not to show that the criterion is incorrect, but merely that it is not as obvious as it is taken to be by many, and that we might have reasons to explore alternative ways of thinking about ontological commitments.
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Piotr Jaroszyński
Translator Hugh McDonald
properties. Brentano thought that the objects of our intentions have a special mode of existence independently of the things to which the intentions correspond in reality. Here, Brentano gave equal consideration to real objects and ideal or imaginary objects. 14 In the conception of the problem of
Series:
Piotr Jaroszyński and Hugh McDonald
properties. Brentano thought that the objects of our intentions have a special mode of existence independently of the things to which the intentions correspond in reality. Here, Brentano gave equal consideration to real objects and ideal or imaginary objects. 14 In the conception of the problem of