MPhil in Philosophy (completed 2010) from the University of Cambridge.
Despite the efforts of meta-ethical expressivists to rebut such worries, one objection raised over and over again against expressivism is that, if the theory is true, matters of morality must be mind-dependent in
guns. In the following section, we will introduce Gibbard’s take on the meaning of “is rational”, together with two of what we take to be its major problems. We will build upon Gibbard’s views to outline our own analysis, within the framework of Minimal Expressivism, in Section 3. As we will see, it is
”, together with two of
what we take to be its major problems. We will build upon Gibbard’s
views to outline our own analysis, within the framework of Minimal
Expressivism, in Section 3. As we will see, it is possible to provide
defend a fourth alternative, revisionary moral expressivism, the adoption of which would entail introducing non-cognitivist moral discourse and judgment to replace our current, cognitivist moral discourse and judgment. Briefly put, revisionary expressivists would recommend that we cease making moral
qualities of international criminal courts, typically having recourse to theories of expressivism for the purpose.
Although expressivism is rooted in a number of different disciplines,
a core thread runs through most expressive strands of thought: social practices convey meanings and transmit
expressivism unable to explain disagreement data. Universal or generic presuppositions of this sort do not yield a conflict of attitudes, unlike expressing conflicting likes or desires. Another view that bears some similarities to Marques’ one is defended by Väyrynen (2013) . According to Väyrynen’s theory
existence of irreducibly normative facts while remaining unaffected by the kinds of arguments that work against non-naturalist realism. This view is expressivism. Interestingly, it is not entirely obvious that expressivism escapes arguments of the relevant sort. James Dreier has recently suggested that
Meaning of ‘Ought’: Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 260 pages. ISBN : 0199363001. Hardback $65.00.
Since the heyday of noncognitivism and debates over the Frege-Geach problem, it is tempting to read the relationship between metaethics