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Author: Moti Mizrahi

1 Introduction Arguments for external world skepticism 1 from skeptical hypotheses begin by taking any proposition about the external world, p , which, if known, implies that the negation of some skeptical hypothesis is also known, and then concluding that one does not know that p

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Ethan Mills

external-world skepticism. I support an epistemological phenomenalist interpretation in which the conclusion is that what is immediately present to the mind are mind-dependent phenomena. Hence, we should suspend judgment on the question of the external world and there is a standing invitation to consider

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Marin Geier

1 Introduction Epistemological skepticism in the guise of external world skepticism remains one of the central topics in contemporary epistemology. This strand of skepticism is sometimes called “Cartesian skepticism” as its classical formulation can be found in Descartes’ Meditations . The

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Kevin McCain

1 Introduction External world skepticism is often motivated by an appeal to various skeptical alternatives to our commonsense view of the external world, such as our being deceived by Descartes’ demon or our being brains in vats. These alternatives are each consistent with our sensory experiences

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
The history of skepticism usually ignores the Middle Ages. It is customary in most historical overviews to say that epistemological skepticism and external-world skepticism did not find its way into the Western philosophical tradition until Sextus Empiricus was rediscovered and retranslated into Latin in the Sixteenth century. It is the aim of this book to show that this is not true and that the history of skepticism must be rewritten. It is only once the rich discussions of both epistemological and external-world skepticism in the Middle Ages are included that the whole history of skepticism can be written, and only then can the development of modern thought be understood. This book begins this rewriting of the history of skepticism by tracing discussions of skepticism from Al-Ghazali to sixteenth century Paris.
Contributors are Taneli Kukkonen, Martin Pickave, Claude Panaccio, David Piche, Christophe Grellard, Gyula Klima, Dominik Perler, Henrik Lagerlund, and Elizabeth Karger

experience is presupposed by inner experience. Moreover, we enjoy immediate cognitive access to outside things rather than cognitive access mediated by inference. Now, as epistemological external-world skepticism questions the existence of those things outside us, the same reader comes to the conclusion that

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Alan Thomas

methodological framework is very much in evidence when it is asserted that the only assumption driving external world scepticism is a narrow, interfacing, conception of experience (McDowell 2008: 378–9). That single error leads to the “contamination” of our ordinary practices by sceptical doubt and with that

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Esben Petersen

merits of skeptical invariantism and a widely discussed version of epistemic contextualism. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section compares Lewisian contextualism and a particular version of external world skepticism with respect to their predictions as to when speakers should be expected to

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Frank X. Ryan

For several decades renewed interest in the role of perception in knowledge has sustained a robust debate over external world skepticism ( ews ). Traceable to the antirealist movement of the 1980s, the dispute centers on the question of our epistemic access to the external world. 1 However, a

In: Contemporary Pragmatism
Author: Mark Walker

is not radically underdetermined. 5 Underdetermination vs. Radical Underdetermination Arguments Underdetermination arguments for external world skepticism are typically expounded as comprising a major and minor premise. U1: S’s evidence for believing mwh is not greater than S’s evidence

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism