Christian Barry and David Wiens

Introduction When people commit wrongs against others, this often gives rise not only to harm to their victims, but also to benefits. Some of these benefits accrue not to the wrongdoer, but to people who are innocent of any wrongdoing whatsoever. Some moral theorists argue that merely being an

Molly Gardner

Introduction The concept of harming features prominently in many of the explanations we give for moral judgments. We often judge that certain actions were wrong because they were harmful, or that other actions were permissible because no harm was done. But it is not just the presence or

Series:

Elisabeth Gedge

In this essay I analyse the claim that the expanding practices of prenatal genetic diagnosis (PGD) constitute a threat to the status of persons with disabilities. First I consider whether genetic testing for disability differs ethically from routine prenatal interventions, and sends the message that persons with disabilities are not welcome. Drawing from the literature on the politics of recognition, I then identify the harms associated with subordinate status, showing how the symbolism of our reproductive genetic practices contribute to these harms. Finally, I consider ways to reconceptualise harm in terms of dignity and equality so as to resist the subordination of persons with disabilities.

Lois Presser, Jennifer L. Schally and Christine Vossler

-eaters, and compared their statements, points of emphasis, and stories. The vegans insisted that animals had interests of their own and spoke of consumption choices. The meat-eaters tended to reduce animals to human purposes, claimed powerlessness to avoid doing harm to animals, and also referenced some

Risky Killing

How Risks Worsen Violations of Objective Rights

Seth Lazar

1 Introduction Many believe that harming intentionally is objectively worse than doing so as a foreseen but unintended consequence of your action. In this paper, I argue for a similar distinction between harms that are more and less foreseeable. Harming someone when it was more likely that your

Gerhard Øverland

Those arguing against the permissibility of killing innocent aggressors take mere causal contribution to harm to be morally insignificant. 1 To be a permissible target for defensive force according to this view, a person must be morally responsible for a threat to others. In this paper I argue

Saul Smilansky

We sometimes harm people legitimately, by standing in front of them in the queue at the cinema and buying the last available ticket, for instance, or by acting in self-defense. If we harm them illegitimately, however, we ostensibly have a moral obligation to compensate them for the harm done

Vicki Paskalia

of the Directive related to the issue of legal remedies in cases of harm. Safe, high-quality healthcare is an important objective of the Directive, and the availability of legal remedies in cases of harm should be regarded as necessary to achieve these objectives. The article starts with a short

Timothy Hall

Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2008) 50–76 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI 10.1163/174552408X306726 JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY www.brill.nl/jmp Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources Timothy Hall * Department of Philosophy, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH 44074, USA timothy

Grundmann, C.H.

Harms, Georg Ludwig (auch: Louis) Detlev Theodor (5.5.1808 Walsrode – 14.11.1865 Hermannsburg), die prägende Gestalt der in ihren Auswirkungen bis in die Gegenwart hinein wahrnehmbaren Hermannsburger Erweckung (: I., 7.) und Gründer der Hermannsburger Mission (1849). Nach dem Theologiestudium in