Search Results

1 Introduction Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinge propositions’—those propositions that stand fast for us and around which all empirical enquiry turns—remains controversial and elusive, and none of the recent attempts to make sense of it strike me as entirely satisfactory. The literature on this

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Mark Walker

1 Introduction One deployment of Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge propositions, specifically what we shall refer to as the ‘entitlement strategy’ as championed by Crispin Wright and others, is said to offer an antidote to some forms of skepticism. 1 As we shall see, the basic anti

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

1 Introduction The hinge propositions discussed by Moore and Wittgenstein have loomed large in some of the most illuminating strands of analytic epistemology. For three good reasons. First, hinge propositions promise an indirect response to sceptical challenges, either because they mark limits

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: John Greco

hand,” or “The earth has existed long before my birth.” He goes on to identify many more such propositions (let’s call them ‘hinge propositions’), which he thinks are examples of a pervasive yet odd phenomenon. On Certainty is Wittgenstein’s attempt to understand and explain the phenomenon, and in

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

a common conviction about the importance of relying on first principles or hinge propositions, they also illustrate how rather different views can be had on what these should amount to. The aim of this paper is to try and show how and why, in the end, Peirce’s Critical Commonsensist attitude seems

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

of hinges. In “Hinge Propositions and the Logical Exclusion of Doubt,” Genia Schönbaumsfeld maintains that Wittgenstein’s notion of “hinge propositions” remains controversial and elusive, none of the attempts to make sense of it striking her as entirely satisfactory. She sees the literature on this

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
In: Hinge Epistemology
Author: John Greco

of Hinge Propositions? On Pritchard’s account of hinge commitments, such commitments do not qualify as beliefs and for this reason are not candidates for knowledge. Pritchard’s reasoning here is that beliefs are essentially reason-responsive in a way that hinge commitments essentially are not

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Allan Hazlett

resemblances to theoretical necessities grounded in the unthinkable. Belief in hinge propositions is “irreversible” (§245), one “cannot depart” from these judgments (§419), these statements are “ incapable of falsehood” (§436) and “ cannot be false” (§437), and we can’t see how a mistake about them would be

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

assessable, in what sense, if any, could they still be regarded as propositions ? That is, if bipolarity 4 is the mark of propositionality, how could Wittgenstein consistently claim that they are hinge- propositions ? Wouldn’t it be more correct to say that they are sentences that don’t express any

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism